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Die ökonomische Theorie kann viele Facetten des kooperativen Verhaltens, die durch einen 
Konflikt zwischen Individual- und Gemeinschaftsinteressen gekennzeichnet sind, wie z.B. 
Kooperation in sozialen Dilemmasituationen, nicht umfassend erklären. Empirische Evidenz 
aus experimentellen Untersuchungen zeigt, dass sogar elementare institutionelle 
Rahmenbedingungen wie einfache Belohnungs- oder Bestrafungsmechanismen Kooperation 
fördern können, falls diese in einer Gesellschaft von Außen (exogen) „installiert“ werden. Die 
Frage, ob diese Sanktionsmechanismen von Individuen selbst (endogen) gewählt und einen 
Wettbewerb mit alternativen Institutionen „überleben“ würden, ist noch nicht ausreichend 
beantwortet worden. Diese Dissertation trägt zur Kooperationsforschung bei, indem sie die 
endogene Wahl von Institutionen wie Bestrafungs- und Belohnungsmechanismen und deren 
Auswirkungen auf Kooperationsverhalten in sozialen Dilemmasituationen untersucht. 




Standard economic theory fails to explain many facets of cooperative behavior, e.g., 
cooperation in social dilemma situations which are characterized by the conflict between 
individual and collective interests. There is empirical evidence from experimental studies 
showing that even elementary institutional arrangements such as simple reward or punishment 
mechanisms can foster cooperation when these mechanisms are exogenously “installed” in a 
community. The question of whether these sanctioning mechanisms would be endogenously 
chosen by individuals and “survive” a competition with alternative institutions is not yet 
satisfactorily answered. This thesis contributes to the literature on cooperation by 
investigating the endogenous choice of institutions with punishment and reward mechanisms, 
and by exploring their effects on cooperative behavior in social dilemma situations. 
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The phenomenon of human cooperation is object of the study in many research disciplines. 
While evolutionary models based on kinship (Hamilton, 1964) and direct reciprocity (Trivers, 
1971) explain cooperation among relatives and in direct relationships, the emergence and 
evolution of cooperation in large groups is still not fully understood. Standard economic 
theory fails in explaining many facets of cooperative behavior, e.g., cooperation in social 
dilemma situations which are characterized by the conflict between individual and collective 
interests. In contrast to theoretical predictions, experimental evidence shows the existence of 
cooperation even in social dilemma situations (see e.g. Ledyard, 1995 or Camerer, 2003). 
However, if institutional rules are absent, cooperation is highly fragile. 
Institutions can be broadly defined as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms 
of repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom, 2005). The institutional framework defines 
“the rules of the game” on which the monetary and non-monetary consequences of 
individuals’ actions depend. It is obvious that institutional arrangements influence the 
behavior of the interacting individuals in social dilemma situations. For this reason it is of 
great interest to study the relationship between the institutional framework and human 
behavior in social dilemmas. If we can understand how institutions work and how they 
influence the human behavior we will be able to design efficient institutions that minimize the 
downside effects that are inherent to social dilemmas. 
There exists theoretical and empirical evidence that even elementary institutional 
arrangements such as simple reward or punishment mechanisms can foster cooperation once 
these mechanisms are exogenously “installed” in a community (see e.g., Yamagishi, 1986, 
Ostrom et al., 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Sefton et al., forthcoming). In these studies, 
however, members neither have the possibility to abstain from the interaction nor the 
opportunity to leave the community in order to establish a new community with different 
institutional arrangements. The question of whether sanctioning mechanisms would be 
endogenously chosen and “survive” a competition with alternative institutions is not yet 
satisfactorily answered. 
This thesis contributes to the cooperation research by investigating the endogenous choice of 
institutions and their effects on cooperative behavior in social dilemma situations. The 
competition between institutions is modeled by letting individuals endogenously decide under 
which institutional arrangements they want to interact with other individuals in a social 
dilemma situation. In other words, individuals have the opportunity to vote with their feet by 
voluntarily joining the preferred institution or community. 
Chapter 1 investigates experimentally whether a community with sanctioning possibilities 
performs better than a community without any sanctioning mechanism. Subjects are 
repeatedly given the choice between a community with reward and punishment possibilities 
and a community without any sanctioning options, i.e., a pure voluntary contribution 
mechanism. Initially, most subjects are reluctant to join the community with sanctioning 
possibilities. However, individuals with a strong disposition to cooperate manage to establish 
a “cooperative culture” by contributing high to the joint project and punishing the free-riders 
harshly. The heavy punishment in the beginning causes efficiency losses in the short run, but 
ensures that the sanctioning community becomes more profitable than the non-sanctioning 
community in the long-run. Hence, the sanctioning community attracts more and more 
subjects. In the end, the overwhelming majority of subjects inhabit the sanctioning 
community while the non-sanctioning community gets depopulated. Moreover, the 
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cooperation flourishes in the sanctioning community. Virtually all subjects contribute their 
whole endowment to the public good. A credible punishment threat makes actual punishment 
unnecessary. Thus the ideal of the social optimum is reached. 
Chapter 2 deepens the analysis of the sanctioning mechanisms and their effects on 
cooperation theoretically and experimentally. We disentangle the effects of rewards and 
punishment: in an experiment subjects are given the choice to choose between the non-
sanctioning community and a community with a unique sanction option. In one treatment, a 
rewarding community is the alternative to the non-sanctioning community; in the other 
treatment, a punishment community is the alternative. All three institutional arrangements, 
i.e., the non-sanctioning community, and the communities with reward and punishment 
possibilities, are investigated theoretically. To analyze the community choice we develop a 
simple concept of community choice equilibrium based on the inequality aversion theory by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The experimental results are clear cut. While the punishment 
community performs as well as the community with the combined sanctioning possibilities 
from Chapter 1, the reward community performs poorly. Although, there is a relatively high 
cooperation level in the reward community initially, over time it deteriorates to rather low 
levels. However, as in case of the institution with combined sanctioning possibilities from the 
first chapter, the pure punishment community also suffers from considerable initial efficiency 
losses due to heavy punishment. How can these initial efficiency losses be mitigated? 
Chapter 3 deals with this question. One possible explanation for the initial reluctance and 
losses could be that subjects simply not anticipate correctly that the punishment community is 
the more efficient community in the long run. Previous studies show that provision of a social 
history about the results of an experiment may indeed influence the behavior of the informed 
subjects who are going to play the same game (Berg et al., 1995). Thus, in Chapter 3, we 
replicate the treatment with the pure punishment community from Chapter 2 with the addition 
that subjects are given a social history. We conjecture that more information provided to 
participants referring to the superior performance of the punishment community may lower 
the reluctance against it, thus lowering the initial efficiency losses. Indeed, we find that 
informed subjects are significantly less reluctant to join the punishment community. 
Moreover, the social optimum of full cooperation is established more rapidly and there are 
less efficiency losses due to reduced punishment activity. 
The findings from Chapter 1-3 indicate that there exists a fundamental difference between the 
use of rewards and punishment. While punishment is an effective instrument exerted by 
contributors to discipline free-riders, rewards are usually given by cooperators to those who 
already cooperate. Thus, one possible reason for the poor performance of the reward 
community could be that only the “good” reward each other. The question arises whether the 
reward mechanism would perform better in a hierarchical framework, e.g., if a senior member 
of the community or a leader in a work team possesses the discriminatory power to reward or 
to punish. 
In Chapter 4, we experimentally investigate in a team-work setting which mechanism team 
leaders prefer when they have the choice to apply a positive incentive scheme (rewards) or a 
negative incentive scheme (punishment), and how different incentive schemes influence the 
performance of teams. Dependent on the chosen incentive scheme, the leader can individually 
reward or punish his teammates. Initially, almost all leaders prefer using positive incentives. 
However, this preference changes over time and finally the majority of the leaders opt for 
negative incentives. Initially, teams’ overall performances are higher under the positive 
incentive scheme than under the negative incentive scheme. However, after a while, the teams 
under the negative incentive scheme perform better. In the end, cooperation under the positive 
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incentive scheme breaks down completely whereas in teams experiencing the negative 
incentive scheme leaders as well as teammates maintain high contribution levels. 
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1. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions1 
1.1. Introduction 
Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the 
maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing 
empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present 
versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human 
societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance 
cooperation when directly competing with non-punishment institutions is highly controversial 
in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally 
that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free 
institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the 
sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates while the sanction-free society becomes fully 
depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions 
and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional 
selection. 
The uniqueness of human cooperation necessitates investigations that reach beyond the 
explanations of cooperative behavior of non-human animals (see e.g. Stevens and Hauser, 
2004, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, Henrich et al., 2001, Ostrom et al., 1999, Hammerstein, 
2003). Profound empirical evidence shows that the possibility of sanctioning norm violators 
stabilizes human cooperation at a high level whereas cooperation typically collapses in the 
absence of sanctioning possibilities (see e.g. Yamagishi, 1986, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, 
Ostrom et al., 1992, Andreoni et al., 2003, Masclet et al., 2003, Rege and Telle, 2004). Would 
a sanctioning institution deliberately be adopted when individuals can choose between a 
sanctioning and a sanction-free institution? The considerable payoff losses in the process 
towards stable cooperation – for both the punishers and the punished individuals – as well as 
natural resentments against punishment caused for example by its detrimental effects might 
guide individuals’ choice towards the sanction-free institution (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). 
The argument that higher cooperation levels in sanctioning institutions “automatically” lead 
to their prevalence – because rational individuals choose the institution with the higher payoff 
(Binmore, 2005) – is often brought forward as an affirmative argument for the competitive 
advantage of sanctioning institutions. The force of this argument can be questioned, however, 
since it displaces rather than solves the evolutionary puzzle of human cooperation. The reason 
for this is that stable cooperation requires a positive share of individuals who carry personal 
costs for cooperation and punishment to the benefit of the entire group (Gintis, 2000, Fehr et 
al., 2002, Gintis et al., 2003). These individuals have a clear payoff disadvantage compared to 
cooperators who free-ride on the punishment acts. Recent research shows that a positive share 
of strong reciprocators – cooperating individuals who are willing to reward fair behavior and 
to punish unfair behavior even when they cannot gain materially from doing so – can be 
evolutionarily stable (Boyd et al., 2003, Bowles and Gintis, 2004). But what happens if the 
population is perfectly mobile and is permanently invaded by outsiders from a non-
cooperative environment who are attracted by high payoffs from cooperation? Is the fraction 
of strong reciprocators who choose the sanctioning institution sufficiently large to keep up the 
cooperative culture? These arguments cast serious doubt on the prevalence of sanctioning 
institutions. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on the article “The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions” published in 
Science, 2006, Vol. 312(5770), pp. 108-111, joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch and Bettina Rockenbach. All 
authors contributed equally.  
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However, several affirmative arguments for the competitive advantage of sanctioning 
institutions also come to mind, e.g. the considerable frequency of institutional frameworks 
which facilitate the sanctioning of norm violators in human societies (Mahdi, 1986,  Johnson 
and Earle, 1987, Wiessner, 2005) and the recent finding that humans derive satisfaction from 
punishing defectors (de Quervain et al., 2004). Additionally, theories of cultural and 
institutional selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1992, Henrich and Boyd, 2001, Boyd and 
Richerson, 2002, Henrich, 2004) that ground on the exceptional human ability of social 
learning support the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. They suggest that 
individuals preferentially migrate to groups with higher payoffs and imitate the decisions 
prevalent in these groups. Hence, group members punish, because it is common to do so. 
When cooperation is sufficiently widespread, the payoff-disadvantage from punishing is 
relatively small and only a weak tendency for conformist behavior suffices to stabilize the 
punishment of non-cooperators. 
We inquire into the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions in a laboratory 
experiment with the novel feature of implementing permanent competition between a 
sanctioning and a sanction-free institution through endogenous choice. It allows one to study 
the evolution of the different institutions over time as well as the changes in behavior in the 
same individual when participating in different social settings. 
1.2. Experimental Design 
In our experiment, 84 participants anonymously interact in a social dilemma situation in 30 
repetitions. Each repetition consists of three stages: An institution choice stage (S0), a 
voluntary contribution stage (S1), and a sanctioning stage (S2). In stage S0, the participants 
simultaneously and independently choose between a sanctioning institution (SI) and a 
sanction-free institution (SFI) in which neither positive sanctioning (rewards) nor negative 
sanctioning (punishment) is possible. In stage S1, each participant interacts in a public goods 
game with all other participants who have chosen the same institution in S0: each player is 
endowed with 20 money units (MUs) and may contribute between 0 and 20 MUs to a public 
good. Each group member equally profits from the public good, independent from his or her 
own contribution. The MUs not contributed to the public good are transferred to the 
participant’s private account. The diametrically opposed individual and collective interests 
constitute the social dilemma in public good provision: It is always in the material self-
interest of any subject to free-ride on the contributions of others and to keep all MUs for the 
private account, while the collective interest demands full contribution of all group members. 
After the players have simultaneously made their contribution decisions, they are informed 
about the contributions of each member in the own group. In stage S2 each player in SI may 
positively or negatively sanction other members of SI by assigning between zero and 20 
tokens to other members. Each token employed as a negative sanction costs the punished 
member 3 MUs and the punishing member 1 MU. Each token employed as a positive sanction 
yields the receiving member 1 MU and costs the employing member 1 MU. At the end of the 
period each participant receives detailed (but anonymous) information about each of the other 
participants from both institutions (see the Appendix for more details on the methods). 
1.3. Results 
The initial choice of institution provides a clear picture: only about one third of the 
participants (mean 36.9 percent; standard error 4.0 percent) prefer SI to SFI in the first period. 
The revealed institution preference correlates with different types of behavior (see also 
Fischbacher et al., 2001, Kurzban and Houser, 2005). Participants who initially join SI 
contribute on average 12.7 MUs (standard error 0.79) in the first period, while on average 
only 7.3 MUs (standard error 0.54) are contributed in SFI (Wilcoxon signed rank matched 
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pairs test, z = −2.366, P = 0.016, two-tailed). Almost half the subjects (mean 48.4 percent; 
standard error 8.5 percent) who opt for SI in the first period are “high contributors” in the 
sense that they contribute at least 15 MUs. Almost three fourths (mean 73.3 percent; standard 
error 17.0 percent) of these high contributors exert punishment tokens in order to discipline 
low contributors and thus try to enforce and establish a norm of high cooperation. These 
subjects amount to 13.1 percent (standard error 4.0 percent) of the total subject population and 
can clearly be classified as “strong reciprocators”, i.e. subjects with a predisposition to make 
high contributions and to punish norm-violators. In contrast, 16.1 percent (standard error 5.2 








































































Figure 1.1 Subjects’ choice of institution and their contributions. Figure 1.1 displays the average contributions 
in both institutions over the 30 periods of the interaction measured as the percentage of endowment contributed 
to the public good. 
The situation is completely different in SFI, where in the first period almost half of the 
subjects are free-riders (mean 43.4 percent; standard error 3.4 percent) while high contributors 
are rare (mean 11.3 percent; standard error 4.3 percent). A subject who chooses SFI in the 
first period with a contribution of more than 15 MUs and employs negative sanctions 
immediately after having switched to SI may also be classified as a strong reciprocator. We 
observe exactly two subjects with this behavior in our subject population (2.4 percent), so that 
15.5 percent (standard error 5.6 percent) is a lower bound for the proportion of strong 
reciprocators in the subject population. Initially, the significantly higher contributions in SI do 
not result in higher payoffs in SI: Average payoffs in the first period of SI (mean 38.1; 
standard error 2.05) are significantly lower than in SFI (mean 44.4; standard error 0.32) 
(Wilcoxon signed rank matched pairs test, z = −2.047, P = 0.047, two-tailed). Due to immense 
punishment activities, free-riders earn significantly less in SI (mean 30.2; standard error 4.51) 
than in SFI (mean 49.7; standard error 0.86) in the first period (Wilcoxon signed rank 
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Figure 1.2 Payoffs of the two predominant behavioral patterns, “free-riders” (contributions between 0 and 5 
MUs) in the sanction-free institution (SFI) and “high contributors” (contributions between 15 and 20 MUs) in 
the sanctioning institution (SI). Note that the highest attainable payoff (under full contributions of all subjects 
and no punishment) is 52 and the payoff from complete free-riding and no punishment is 40. 
Although subjects are initially reluctant to join SI, it becomes predominant over time; in the 
end virtually all participants (mean 92.9 percent; standard error 3.4 percent) choose SI and 
cooperate fully (Figure 1.1).2 Simultaneously, contributions in SFI decrease to a level of zero. 
In period 10 the contributions in SI are on average 89.9 percent (standard error 10.3 percent) 
of the endowment and from there on they steadily increase. In the last period the difference 
between the two institutions is almost as extreme as it can be with average contributions of 
19.4 MUs (standard error 0.714) in SI and 0 MUs (standard error 0) in SFI. Averaged over all 
periods, subjects in SI contribute 18.3 MUs (91.4 percent of the endowment; standard error 
5.0 percent), while subjects in SFI contribute only 2.9 MUs (14.4 percent of the endowment; 
standard error 3.0 percent) (Wilcoxon signed rank matched pairs test, z = −2.366, P = 0.016, 
two-tailed). 
What causes this dramatic change of mind? Pure imitation of the successful behavior would 
lead to an increase of free-riders in SFI because they earn the highest average payoffs in the 
first period. This is actually observed in period two. As a consequence the payoffs of free-
riders in SFI decrease and over the periods, participants in SFI experience the typically 
observed collapse of cooperation in repeated social dilemma interactions (Figure 1.1). A 
comparison of the payoffs of the two predominant behavioral patterns – free-riding in SFI and 
high contributions in SI (Figure 1.2) – shows that from period five onwards a high contributor 
in SI achieves a higher payoff than a free-rider in SFI (Wilcoxon signed rank matched pairs 
test, z = −2.366, P = 0.016, two-tailed). It therefore pays for a monetary payoff maximizing 
participant to switch from free-riding in SFI to contributing in SI. This triggers an amplifying 
effect, namely the greater the number of cooperators in SI, the higher their payoffs. Indeed 
from period 10 on, 86.1 percent (standard error 13.1 percent) of all members of SI contribute 
fully (20 MUs) and 86.0 percent (standard error 8.6 percent) in SFI contribute almost nothing 
(2 MUs or less). The finding that players apparently choose institutions according to payoffs 
indicates that stochastic forces play only a minor role in determining switching behavior 
(Young, 1998). 
                                                 
2 Figure A1.1 in the supporting online material displays the exact flow in both directions between institutions 
from one period to the next. 
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A closer look at individual behavior immediately before and after migration from one 
institution to the other confirms the bipolar pattern of behavior induced by the two 
institutions. In fact, 80.3 percent (standard error 5.0 percent) of subjects increase their 
contribution when migrating from SFI to SI in two consecutive periods. And 27.1 percent 
(standard error 5.3 percent) of subjects even “convert” from being a complete free-rider 
(contributing 0 MUs) to a full cooperator (contributing 20 MUs) when switching from SFI to 
SI. The migration behavior in the opposite direction, i.e. from SI to SFI, is similarly extreme. 
Roughly 70 percent (mean 70.9 percent; standard error 4.9 percent) of subjects reduce their 
contribution when switching from SI to SFI and about 20 percent (mean 17.0 percent; 
standard error 4.7 percent) switch from full cooperation to free-riding. 
Individual payoff maximization cannot explain why new members in SI follow the second 
norm established by the strong reciprocators who joined SI in early periods, i.e. the norm to 
punish low contributors. The most successful behavior would be to contribute in SI (and 
hence avoid being punished), but refrain from the costly punishment of others. Since 
punishment of defectors constitutes a second-order public good (in which defection cannot be 
sanctioned in our setting), individual payoff maximization would rule out punishment. 
However, only a minority of subjects follow this payoff maximizing behavior. The 
overwhelming majority of 62.9 percent (standard error 8.5 percent) of the subjects 
immediately conforms to and adopts the prevailing norm of punishment in SI, i.e. they always 
use punishment immediately after they switch to SI. This results in a quite stable proportion 
of roughly 40 percent (mean 42.1 percent; standard error 5.9 percent) of subjects who both 
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Figure 1.3 Payoffs and percentages of punishers and non-punishers among the “high contributors” 
(contributions between 15 and 20 MUs) in the sanctioning institution (SI). Note that the highest attainable payoff 
(under full contributions of all subjects and no punishment) is 52 and the payoff from complete free-riding and 
no punishment is 40. 
Figure 1.3 also illustrates that the payoff difference between high contributors who punish and 
those who do not constantly diminishes over time because punishment becomes ever more 
unnecessary. Additionally, since the absolute number of punishers increases, the individual 
burden from effectively punishing free-riders becomes smaller over time3. Towards the end, 
                                                 
3 A logistic regression shows that the stay duration in SI in terms of the number of periods has a significantly 
negative influence on the likelihood to punish others (see Table A1.1 in the Appendix). Note, however, that 
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subjects who both contribute highly and punish exhibit a payoff disadvantage of less than two 
percent, hence the “selection pressure” against strong reciprocators becomes quite weak.4 
This leads to a continuous increase in efficiency gains in SI up to 95.8 percent (standard error 
4.6 percent) in the final period, whereas efficiency gains in SFI converge to zero (mean 0; 
standard error 0.0). 
Although the use of both positive and negative sanctions per individual decreases over time, 
the ratio in which they are used is rather stable: on average 1.66 negative sanction points 
(standard error 0.60) are allocated per positive sanction point. A Tobit regression of the 
combined effect of positive and negative sanctions exhibits a clear positive impact of 
punishment on subsequent contributions, while positive sanctions have a slightly negative but 
rather insignificant effect (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 Results of a Tobit regression, explained variable: Contribution (t+1) – Contribution (t) 
 Coefficient Z value 
Negative sanctions in t .444 
 (.085) 
5.24*** 






Tobit regression for subjects who opted for SI in period t and t+1 with a robust estimation for the standard errors 
using the independent observations as clusters. 
*** denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses denote the robust standard errors. 
 
It seems that positive sanctions are not perceived as an unambiguous encouragement to 
increase the contribution; perhaps they are taken as an indication that the contribution has 
been higher than expected by others and hence may be lowered. These observations reflect the 
asymmetry between negative and positive sanctions. Positive sanctions are addressed to those 
who already abide by the social norm and in order to preserve the approval of cooperation, a 
continuous application of the instrument is required. Negative sanctioning, by contrast, is an 
instrument for disapproving of norm violating behavior and needs only be exerted if the norm 
is not followed. If an individual abides by the norm, punishment is not necessary. The threat 
of punishment alone is able to support cooperation. 
1.4. Conclusions 
Our results show that the sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a “voting-with-
one’s-feet” competition with a sanction-free institution. The results provide profound 
empirical evidence for the existence and importance of strong reciprocators as well as a form 
of conformist behavior as described in models of cultural selection. The initial establishment 
of the “norm to cooperate and punish free-riders” is mainly driven by the steadfastness of the 
strong reciprocators to punish non-cooperative subjects, despite severe individual losses 
(Camerer and Fehr, 2006). Although they are a minority, they manage to establish and 
enforce a cooperative culture which attracts even previously non-cooperative individuals and 
thus resolves the social dilemma. The predominant tendency to punish norm violators after a 
migration from the non-cooperative environment of the sanctioning-free institution to the 
sanctioning institution provides support for the assumption that humans adapt to the common 
                                                                                                                                                        
individually exerted punishment may be lowered over time to effectively punish a free-rider because the number 
of potential punishers becomes larger. In fact, average payoffs of free-riders decrease over periods as can be seen 
from Figure A1.2 in the Appendix. 
4 In the last ten periods subjects who contribute highly and punish reach on average 98.7 percent of the payoff of 
subjects who contribute highly but do not punish. 
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behavior although it deviates from the payoff maximizing behavior. This tendency for 
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2. Community Choice in Social Dilemmas –  
A “Voting with One’s Feet” Approach5 
2.1. Introduction 
Understanding the determinants and the extent of human cooperation is one of the most 
challenging questions in many fields of science, in particular in economics and political 
sciences. For example, sustainable use of natural resources, the conservation of the global 
climate, or the ban of nuclear weapons requires cooperation among members of the 
“international community”, although a defection strategy would be myopically beneficial for 
individual parties. The conflict between collective and individual interests creates the well-
known free-riding problem inherent to social dilemmas (Hardin 1968, Dawes 1980). To 
enforce and maintain cooperative behavior, humans engage in shaping their social 
environment, e.g., by creating institutional frameworks. Myriads of laws and regulations have 
been established throughout the history. Recent examples for such institutions are the “Kyoto 
Protocol” or the “Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)”. While the 
former deals with the global greenhouse effect, the latter is dedicated to the promotion of 
peaceful solutions in international conflicts. However, the success of such institutions or 
communities largely depends on their acceptance and members’ voluntary contributions. 
In order to separate between different motives for cooperation and defection, researchers have 
intensively studied behavior in social dilemmas in controlled laboratory experiments (for 
overviews see e.g., Ledyard 1995, Croson 1998, Ostrom 1998, Camerer 2003). In sequential 
social dilemmas remarkable levels of cooperation have been observed, even in interactions 
with completely anonymous strangers (see e.g., Weimann 1994, Berg et al. 1995, Brandts and 
Schram 2001, Fehr et al. 1998, 2002, Henrich et al. 2001). In repeated interactions, 
cooperation is rarely stable and deteriorates to rather low levels towards the end of the 
interaction period. In a number of recent studies possibilities to punish norm violators have 
been identified as valuable means to sustain cooperation. Already relatively weak forms of 
negative sanctions, like symbolic punishment (Masclet et al. 2003) or other forms of social 
approval (Gächter and Fehr 1999, Rege and Telle 2004) have been shown to be quite effective 
at least in the short run. If the punishment allows reducing the income of the punished player, 
it is heavily used, even if punishing incurs costs for the punisher (Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom et 
al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002). In addition it has been shown that rewards have a 
much weaker effect on cooperation (Sefton et al., forthcoming). 
A common feature of the experimental studies on sanctioning in social dilemmas is that the 
framework for the interaction is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. However, in 
reality, humans often choose from various existing “institutions” or “communities” that 
govern the interaction of its members. For example, people choose to work in a certain firm 
because of the family friendly (flexible) work times or the cooperative atmosphere. Some 
wealthy citizens move to neighboring states or to other cities because of the low tax levels. 
These examples raise the question on the “success” of different mechanisms in environments 
in which members of the society may “vote with their feet” by choosing the institutional 
mechanisms. 
In this paper we study the endogenous community choice in a social dilemma situation in 
which different communities with different institutional frameworks already exist. The 
                                                 
5 This chapter is based on the working paper “Community Choice in Social Dilemmas –  
A “Voting with One’s Feet” Approach”, joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch and Bettina Rockenbach. All authors 
contributed equally. 
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novelty of our experimental approach is that members of the society may freely join the 
community in which they want to interact (i.e., to play the social dilemma). They are free to 
move back and forth between communities. In particular, a community is not able to “close 
the doors” and exclude subjects with “undesired behavior” (such as free-riders). Hence, the 
idea of our setting shows similarities to Tiebout’s famous approach according to which people 
choose a community that matches their preferences best (Tiebout, 1956). 
Our analysis of the situation is both theoretically and experimentally. We extend a social 
dilemma game – as theoretically analyzed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and experimentally 
investigated by Fehr and Gächter (2000) and others – by adding a community choice stage 
prior to the contribution stage. At the beginning of each repetition each player may choose to 
join either a community with costly sanctioning possibilities (punishment or reward) or a 
community without any sanctioning options. In each period a player then interacts with all 
other players who have chosen the same community in that round. Hence, the size and the 
composition of each community are endogenously determined. This allows us to study the 
initial and the over-time acceptance of different communities using different mechanisms and 
their ability to sustain cooperation in social dilemma situations. 
Since very recently, a growing number of studies emphasize the importance of the 
endogenous choice of the interaction parameters in social dilemma situations. Several studies 
experimentally investigate the endogenous choice of the “partners” (Ehrhart and Keser, 1999, 
Hauk and Nagel, 2001, Coricelli et al., 2004, Page et al. 2005) by modeling a choice stage 
previous to the interaction.6 Another strand of studies is more similar to our approach. They 
typically consider situations in which a group of individuals decides by vote upon the 
institutional rules before interacting repeatedly with each other in a fixed composition. While 
in Sutter et al. (2006) inexperienced subjects decide between different institutions by 
unanimity vote, in Ostrom et al. (1992) and Ertan et al. (2005) subjects interact in alternative 
institutions before they decide (by majority vote) whether and to what extent punishment shall 
be present in a further interaction. Botelho et al. (2007) let subjects vote for a final period of 
play after experiencing different mechanisms. Gürerk et al. (2006) investigate the choice 
between a sanctioning institution and a non-sanctioning institution with the endogenous 
choice mechanism as used in this study. But in that study, subjects can only opt for a 
sanctioning institution in which both mechanisms – reward and punishment – are possible. 
Some other studies investigate endogenous group formation, through voting with possible 
“mergers” between groups and the power to exclude individuals from groups Charness and 
Yang (2007) or with various entry/exit options Ahn et al. (forthcoming). 
To obtain a benchmark for our experimental findings we theoretically investigate possible 
equilibria and the incentives to choose a particular community. If the choice is between a non-
sanctioning community (NSC) and a community with punishment possibilities (PuC), we find 
that equilibria with positive contributions occur under very restrictive conditions and do 
almost never exist if punishment causes relatively mild harm. The reason lies in the fragility 
of cooperative communities. They attract free-riders who easily destroy the cooperation. 
Nevertheless, we show that stable constellations with positive contributions are possible. If 
the choice is between NSC and a community with reward possibilities (ReC), equilibria with 
positive contributions are rare since these equilibria require a relatively great fraction of 
players to who must bear considerable costs to reward all other community members.  
                                                 
6 Partner selection and its effects on behavior is also explored in other contexts, e.g. market interactions 
(Kirchsteiger et al., 2005, and Brown et al. 2004), and networks (Riedl and Ule 2003). 
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Two remarkable experimental results are observed. First, having the choice between NSC and 
PuC, initially, more than two-thirds of the subjects decide to interact in NSC, but over rounds 
the proportion of the subjects in this community steadily decreases with an almost complete 
extinction towards the end of the experiment. Second, the majority of subjects who initially 
choose PuC, heavily punish free-riders and achieve almost full cooperation. This cooperation 
is surprisingly stable and it even continues when the interacting group becomes large – in fact, 
in the end almost all subjects join PuC. Interestingly, a choice between ReC and NSC does 
not lead to such a clear picture. Over time, in both communities a decay of cooperation is 
observed and subjects move back and forth between the two communities with a more or less 
constant fraction of the total population in both communities. 
2.2. A simple model of community choice 
In this section we present a simple model that allows us to study the community choice with a 
“voting with one’s feet” approach. In the community choice game, players choose between 
two communities before interacting in a social dilemma situation with others who choose the 
same community. Three different communities are considered: the non-sanctioning 
community (NSC) resembles the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. In the 
punishment community (PuC) players may punish other players; in the reward community 
(ReC) players may reward others. Specifically, in PuC and ReC, players have the possibility 
to influence other members’ payoffs after having observed their individual contributions. We 
focus on two sets on alternatives: first, a situation in which the choice is between NSC and 
PuC. This is called the PUN treatment. In the other situation the choice is between NSC and 
ReC to which we will refer as the REW treatment. We consider a three stage game consisting 
of a “voting with one’s feet” stage (S0), a voluntary contribution stage (S1) and a sanctioning 
stage (S2). With respect to stages S1 and S2 our game is analogous to the game analyzed by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999); we augment their design by the community choice stage S0. 
2.2.1. Community choice stage 
In the community choice stage S0, each of the M players from the population individually 
chooses in which community he or she wants to interact with other players. The community 
choice is not costly for the players. Once all players have completed their community choice, 
they are informed about the total number of players θn  with },{ SN∈θ  who have chosen 
each of the two communities, where Nn  stands for the number of players choosing NSC and 
Sn  for the number of players choosing PuC or ReC, respectively. The identities of the 
players, however, are not revealed. 
2.2.2. Contribution Stage 
In the contribution stage S1, a player i  interacts solely with those players that have opted for 
the same community. Each player i  is endowed with y  monetary units and may contribute 
ig  ( ygi ≤≤0 ) to a joint project. Players decide simultaneously on how much they 
contribute. The amount not contributed remains at the private disposal of the player.7 The sum 
of all contributions is multiplied by the productivity factor R, that is the total rate of return for 
the whole community from each token invested into the joint project. The resulting amount is 
equally distributed among all community members, independent of their individual 
contribution. Hence, each player receives a marginal per capita return (MPCR) θa  from 
his/her own contribution. In order to give smaller communities the possibility to be as 
                                                 
7 If only a single player joins a community, no joint project can be created and the total endowment of the player 
is automatically transferred to her private account. Therefore this player has no decision in stages S1 and S2. 
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productive as larger ones, we keep the productivity constant, i.e., θθ anR =  with 
1/1 << θθ an . Thus, independent of the community size, the return from the joint project is 
always the same if all members contribute their whole endowment. The consequence of 
holding R constant is that θa  decreases with an increase in θn .
8 However, holding R constant 
guarantees that the payoff per player does not vary with θn , if each community member 
contributes ygi = . After all players have taken their contribution decisions, they are 
informed about the individual contribution of each member in their own community. 
2.2.3. Sanctioning Stage 
At the beginning of the sanctioning stage S2 each player receives z  additional monetary units 
independent of her affiliation as well as her contribution in S1. Players in PuC may use the 
tokens to punish (or to reward in ReC) other members of the own community. Hence, all 
players are equipped with the same sanctioning possibilities, independent of their 
contributions in S1. Providing players in NSC with the same additional endowment eliminates 
incentives to choose the sanctioning community just for the extra “sanctioning tokens”. For 
the members of NSC, the active part of the game ends here. The total monetary payoff of 
player i in NSC is 
(1) ( ) zgagyx n
j jNi
NSC
i ++−= ∑ =1 . 
In PuC (ReC) all players simultaneously decide whether or not to punish (reward) other 
members of their community. Player i can punish (reward) community member j by assigning 
punishment (reward) tokens ijt  to j. Each token assigned by player i to player j incurs a cost of 
1<c 9 token for player i and reduces (increases) the payoff of player j by one token. In total 
each player may assign up to z  tokens. Let iT  denote the amount of tokens that player i 
assigns and iT −  denote the amount tokens that player i receives from the other members of 
her community. The total monetary payoff of player i in PuC results in 






−−++−= ∑ 1 . 
The total monetary payoff of player i in ReC results in 




+−++−= ∑ 1ReC . 
The expressions in parentheses represent the stage payoffs of S1 and S2 respectively. At the 
end of the game all players are informed about all other players’ contributions, their 
sanctioning tokens assigned, their sanctioning tokens received and their resulting total payoff. 
                                                 
8 Isaac and Walker (1988b) examine the effects of different MPCRs in public good experiments. They find 
significantly more free-riding behavior in their low MPCR treatment (0.30) than in the high MPCR condition 
(0.75). Of course this observation emerges from a static comparison between treatments and not from a dynamic 
change of the MPCR within a population. 
9 For punishment, 1<c  reflects the widely accepted assumption, that in general punishing someone is less costly 
than being punished and proven effective elsewhere (compare Abbink et al. 2000, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, or 
Andreoni et al., 2003). With 1<c  the punisher can reduce the absolute “inequality” in payoffs to his own 
disadvantage since the punishment action reduces the income of the punished player more than the own income 
is diminished. For rewards, 1<c  implies that rewarding is efficiency increasing. 
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2.3. Theoretical Analysis 
In this section we first analyze the community choice game assuming that all players solely 
maximize their own monetary payoff and do not care for others’ payoffs. In a second step, we 
investigate the community choice assuming that players may care also for others’ payoffs. In 
particular, we will base our considerations on the inequality aversion model proposed by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) who assume that there are players who dislike inequitable outcomes in 
the sense that they are ready to forego some monetary payoff to reach more equitable 
outcomes. 
2.3.1. Equilibria with purely money maximizing subjects 
While full contribution of all players would be socially optimal because 1>θθ an , for money 
maximizing players in NSC contributing zero is the dominant strategy: Since 1<θa , it is in 
the material self interest of each player to withhold contributions. If it is common knowledge 
that all players aim at maximizing their individual monetary payoff, zero contributions by all 
players constitute the only (Nash) equilibrium. This is true independent of the community 
size. In equilibrium each player earns zy +  tokens. However, the joint payoff of the 
community is maximized if each member contributes her entire endowment. In this case each 
member’s payoff rises to zyan +θθ  tokens, independent of the community size. 
In PuC (ReC), no purely money maximizing player will take the opportunity to punish 
(reward) in S2 since it is costly to do so. Applying backward induction, rational players 
foresee this and do not contribute in S1. Hence, independent of the community size in PuC 
(ReC), in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the one-shot game, players do not contribute 
and do not sanction. In this case the total payoff is zy +  tokens, which is the same as rational 
and purely money maximizing players obtain in NSC. Again, each player’s payoff would be 
zyan +θθ  tokens if all community members fully cooperated. In ReC, however, the joint 
community payoff is maximized if each community member contributes the entire 
endowment and additionally assigns all reward tokens to fellow community members. In this 
case members’ expected/average period payoff would be )/( czyan +θθ  tokens. 
In a world of money maximizing rational actors, in both PUN and REW, a player is 
indifferent between the two communities (i.e., between NSC and PuC, and between NSC and 
ReC, respectively) because in each of them in equilibrium the identical payoff of zy +  will 
be achieved. 
2.3.2. Equilibria with inequality aversion 
In this section we analyze the community choice game under the assumption of inequality 
aversion as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Fehr and Schmidt (henceforth FS) assume 
that there exist at least some players whose utility not only depends on the monetary payoff, 
but also on the degree and the nature of inequality in the payoff allocation. Specifically, an 
“inequity averse” player i weights inequality in payoffs to her disadvantage with a parameter 
iα  and inequality in payoffs to her advantage with a parameter iβ . If ),...,( 1 θnxxx =  denotes 




1 1( ) max{ ,0} max{ ,0}
1 1
n n
i i i j i i i j
j j
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 25
FS assume that both forms of inequality cause disutility, but advantageous inequality has a 
lower weight than disadvantageous inequality, which implies ii βα ≥ . It is also reasonable to 
restrict the parameter for advantageous inequality by 1<iβ  since 1≥iβ  would imply that a 
player is ready to burn one dollar in order to decrease the inequality to his advantage relative 
to another player whose payoff is less. On the other hand, there is no upper bound on iα . 
Following FS we suppose that there exist two types of players. The distinctive characteristic 
of both types is whether a player is happy to cooperate if others cooperate or not. In general, 
by contributing one unit, a player i  generates an individual monetary benefit of θa  (MPCR). 
If others contribute more than i , player i  experiences (non-monetary) disutility from 
advantageous inequality. This means, by increasing the own contribution by one unit, player 
i  can reduce own disutility from advantageous inequality by iβ  (assuming ij ggg >=  for 
all ij ≠ ). The sum of the monetary and the non-monetary benefit ia βθ +  is therefore an 
upper bound for the total return from contributing one extra unit. If this return exceeds the 
monetary benefit of keeping the unit, i.e., if 1iaθ β+ ≥ , then player i  will increase own 
contribution. Following FS, we classify such a player as a conditional cooperator because her 
increase in contribution (cooperation) is triggered by other players who contribute more. If the 
above condition is not fulfilled for player i , i.e., 1iaθ β+ < , then player i ’s dominant 
strategy is to contribute zero to the joint project (see Proposition 4 (a) of FS). Such a player is 
called a free-rider. Because in our model θθ anR = , player i  is a conditional cooperator if and 
only if 
(5) 1)/( ≥+ inR βθ  and 
 a free-rider10 if and only if 
(6) 1)/( <+ inR βθ  . 
FS apply the inequality aversion model to a public goods game with and without punishment 
possibilities in a static context. They show that in the absence of punishment (separating) 
equilibria exist in which a group of conditional cooperators contribute positive amounts while 
free-riders remain from contribution if the contributors do not suffer too much from 
disadvantageous inequality.11 In the presence of punishment possibilities equilibria with 
positive contributions (of all players) may also exist if (at least) some players suffer 
sufficiently from disadvantageous inequality.12 
In the following, we apply the inequality aversion model to our social dilemma context with 
endogenous choice. Since we allow for the choice between the two communities, the number 
of members and thus the MPCR may vary within a community. We assume that the players 
only derive disutility from inequality with regard to the members of their own community and 
are not concerned about inequality with regard to the members of the other community. In a 
first step we will analyze the equilibria for the different communities under the assumption 
that players are not allowed to choose between communities. In a second step we extend our 
analysis by allowing for community choice. 
                                                 
10 Note that “conditional cooperator” and “free-rider” are names for different player types. In particular, as we 
will see later in the analysis, a free-rider does not necessarily always free-ride on contributions and a conditional 
cooperator does not necessarily always contribute. 
11 cf. FS, Proposition 4 (c), p. 839. 
12 cf. FS, Proposition 5, p. 841. 
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2.3.3. Equilibria in the non-sanctioning community (NSC) 
Let Nk  ( NN nk ≤≤0 ) be the number of players with 1)/( <+ inR βθ , i.e. the number of free-
riders. In their Proposition 4 (p. 839), FS identify conditions for the equilibria in a social 
dilemma game (public goods) without sanctioning possibilities. In part (b) of the proposition, 
they show that a unique equilibrium exists in which all players withhold contributions if Nk  is 
sufficiently high. Applied to our model, this means that there exists a unique equilibrium with 
zero contributions in NSC if 2/RkN >  (see Corollary 1 in the appendix)
13. This means that if 
there are “too many” free-riders in NSC all members of NSC defect. 
In Proposition 4 (c) FS show that a (separating) equilibrium may exist in which conditional 
cooperators contribute a positive amount while free-riders remain from contributing, if 
conditional cooperators do not suffer too much from disadvantageous inequality. In our model 
such equilibria may exist if 2/RkN ≤  and 







 is satisfied for all 
conditional cooperators. If all members of NSC are conditional cooperators equilibria with 
0≥ig  also exist (see Corollary 2 in the appendix). 
Summary for the equilibria in NSC 
For 6.1=R , a parameter frequently used in experiments (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002) 
as well as in our experiment the considerations above imply that the existence of already one 
single free-rider in NSC prevents cooperation, i.e., 2/RkN >  is satisfied for all 
},...,1{ NN nk ∈ . Thus, in our setting, a cooperation-equilibrium in NSC is only possible if all 
members are conditional cooperators. 
2.3.4. Equilibria in the punishment community (PuC) 
FS show in their Proposition 5, (p. 841) that in a community with punishment possibilities, a 
pooling equilibrium (in contributions) is possible (i.e., all members contribute to the joint 
project) if there are at least some conditional cooperators who sufficiently care about 
inequality to their disadvantage and thus are ready to punish others who contribute less. We 
apply the results of FS to our model and extend them in preparation of the analysis of the 
equilibria under community choice. Following backward reasoning, we first analyze the 
punishment behavior and then proceed with the contributions. 
Suppose that the community is composed of Sn  players, conditional cooperators and free-
riders, and assume that all players contribute the same amount. Can this be an equilibrium or 
is it profitable to deviate to a lower contribution? Without any punishment, a deviator would 
obtain a higher monetary payoff than all conditional cooperators and thus cause disutility 
from disadvantageous inequality for the cooperators. By punishing the deviator, conditional 
cooperators reduce the deviator’s monetary payoff and thereby decrease their disutility from 
inequality. The disutility from inequality becomes zero if the punishment exactly equalizes 
the monetary payoffs of the conditional cooperators and the deviator (Lemma 1). Whether this 
punishment level will be actually chosen in equilibrium depends on the costs of punishment. 
Loosely speaking they have to be low enough not to eat up the entire utility gain from 
equalizing payoffs (Proposition 1). If there is a positive number of conditional cooperators 
who are ready to punish, equilibria with positive contributions exist (Proposition 2). In the 
absence of those players no equilibrium with 0>ig  exists, unless the population consists of 
                                                 
13 Due to space restrictions some corollaries and all proofs are postponed to appendix. 
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only conditional cooperators (Proposition 3). Obviously, the existence of an equilibrium with 
positive contributions requires a “sufficient number” of conditional cooperators, who are 
ready to punish. Corollary 3 formulates conditions under which such players may be present 
and shows that these restrictions are rather strict. 
Lemma 1 Consider a community of Sn  players who contribute 0>g  to the joint project. If a 
deviator i  with a lower contribution ggi <  is punished by a fraction ' 1S Sn n≤ −  of all other 











Proposition 1 Consider a community of Sn  players who contribute 0>g  to the joint project. 
A deviator i  who deviates to a lower contribution ggi <  will be punished by ' 1S Sn n≤ −  










holds for each of the 'Sn  punishers (1 'Sj n≤ ≤ ). A conditional cooperator who additionally 
satisfies (7) is called a conditional cooperative enforcer (shortly: enforcer). Thus as long as 
the punishment cost c  is sufficiently low it does not pay to deviate from the punishment level 
∗γ , i.e., all enforcers punish with ∗γ . 
We have shown that there exists a punishment level ∗γ  which equalizes the payoffs of a 
contribution deviator and the punishers (Lemma 1) and that there exist players who are ready 
to act as punishers (“enforcers”) if the cost of punishment c  is low enough (Proposition 1). 
Proposition 2 Consider a community of Sn  players with ' 0Sn >  enforcers satisfying (7). 
Then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in PuC in which all players contribute g  to the 
joint project and no punishment occurs on the equilibrium path. 
Intuitively, this means that if there are a sufficient number of players who are ready to punish 
the deviators then a cooperation equilibrium with positive contributions exists in which all 
players contribute the same amount to the joint project on the equilibrium path. Hence, on the 
equilibrium path, there is no need for punishment. 
Proposition 3 Let Sk  denote the number of free-riders in PuC. Consider a community of Sn  







 free-riders and no enforcers satisfying (7) 
(i.e., ' 0Sn = ). Then in the unique equilibrium all players contribute 0=ig . 
If there are no enforcers who threaten to punish the non-contributors the situation in PuC is 
“equivalent” to the situation in NSC without sanctioning possibilities: if there are a sufficient 
number of free-riders Sk  in PuC, then cooperation is impossible and 0=ig  is played in the 
unique equilibrium. 
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As can be seen from Proposition 1, the prevalence of  cooperation in PuC depends on 
condition (7), in particular on the community size Sn , the number of enforcers 'Sn , and their 
inequality parameters jα  and jβ . A closer look reveals that the conditions are relatively strict 
and interesting implications can be deduced. 
Corollary 3 In PuC, an enforcer can only exist if cnn SS /1)'( <− , i.e., if the number of 
“non-enforcers” is strictly lower than the reciprocal value to the cost of punishing somebody 
by one unit. 
From Corollary 3 it follows that if 3/1=c  (as in Fehr and Gächter, 2002 as well as in our 
experiment), then in the presence of one free-rider the total population can “afford” at most 
one non-enforcer in an equilibrium with positive contributions, no matter how large the 
community size is and how many enforcers there are. The intuition for this astonishing 
implication may be stated as follows: By investing c  in punishment, an enforcer reduces the 
monetary payoff of the deviator by exactly one unit, hence the inequality between the payoffs 
of the enforcer and the deviator decreases by )1( c− , i.e., the enforcer’s disutility from being 







. At the same time, the enforcer 
creates a payoff inequality of c  unit with respect to each non-enforcer who does not deviate. 





 with respect to each non-







. For punishment to be profitable for the enforcer, the 
















. This condition is equivalent to what Corollary 3 
proposes: cnn SS /1)'( <− . 
From Corollary 3 it follows: if 3/1=c  then a cooperation equilibrium cannot exist if there 
are three (or more) free-riders. In other words, even thousands of players who highly dislike 
disadvantageous inequality could not “handle” these three free-riders. Note that in an 
equilibrium with positive contributions a single enforcer may be sufficient if this enforcer has 
a sufficiently high jα  and cnn SS /1)'( <− . 
Summary for the equilibria in PuC 
We find that in the presence of at least one free-rider, equilibria with positive contributions 
can only exist if the number of non-enforcers is strictly smaller than c/1  and there is at least 
one enforcer who cares sufficiently about disadvantageous inequality. For 3/1=c , as in our 
setting, the presence of two free-riders implies that all other players must be enforcers for a 
cooperation equilibrium to exist. If all members of PuC are conditional cooperators, equilibria 
with positive contributions may also exist. 
2.3.5. Equilibria in the reward community (ReC) 
In this section we extend the analysis of FS by investigating the equilibria under inequality 
aversion in a social dilemma game with reward possibility. While the analysis of PuC was an 
adaptation of the considerations of FS to our case with varying community size and MPCR, 
the following analysis of ReC has no master copy in FS. 
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First we will show that a (separating) equilibrium with different contributions for free-riders 
and conditional cooperators does not exist (Lemma 2 and Proposition 4). Then, we will 
demonstrate that a pooling equilibrium in which all players contribute the same amount to the 
joint project exists, if there are a sufficient number of conditional cooperators who are ready 
to reward the contributors (Proposition 5). 
Lemma 2 Consider a community of Sn  players. Suppose that 'Sn  players contribute 0>g  to 
the joint project whereas 'SS nn −  players refrain from contributing. If the 'Sn  contributors 







Players who contribute to the joint project obtain not only less monetary payoff but also suffer 
from disadvantageous inequality with respect to the free-riders. However, since rewarding 
increases the payoff of the rewarded player, contributors may reward each other and increase 
their monetary payoffs until their payoffs are equal to the free-riders’ payoffs. Doing so, 
contributors can also eliminate the disutility to their disadvantage from the payoff inequality. 
When searching an equilibrium in which conditional cooperators and free-riders differ in their 
behavior, it is obvious to look at cases in which conditional cooperators contribute and free-
riders do not contribute. In Corollary 1, it was already discussed that without any sanctioning 
options this behavior is not part of an equilibrium play for the parameters frequently used in 
social dilemma games. The question is whether the presence of the reward mechanism may 
stabilize different contribution levels of conditional cooperators and free-riders. Proposition 4 
shows that this is not the case. 
Proposition 4 There is no separating equilibrium in which 'S Sn n≤  conditional cooperators 






gρ  while the remaining 'SS nn −  players do not contribute and do not reward 
any player. 
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows: We have shown that players who contribute to 
the joint project may equalize their payoffs to free-riders’ payoffs (Lemma 2). This situation 
is, however, not stable, and thus cannot be part of an equilibrium since each free-rider (who 
knows the rewarding strategy of the conditional cooperators) has the incentive to contribute 
and thus appear as a conditional cooperator in order to be rewarded by the conditional 
cooperators. This “deviation” of free riders is profitable and creates the instability of the 
separating behavior. 
Does a pooling (in contributions) equilibrium exist, in which all players contribute to the joint 
project but only the conditional cooperators do reward each contributor while the free riders 
do not reward? 
Proposition 5 Consider a community of Sn  players who all contribute 0>g  to the joint 
project. Suppose that a group of SS nn ≤≤ '2  players is ready to reward each player with the 
reward level ∗ρ  who contributes 0>g  while the remaining 'SS nn −  players do not reward 

















holds for each of the 'Sn  players. A conditional cooperator who also satisfies (8) is called a 
reward provider. 
Proposition 5 states that as long as the rewarding cost c  is sufficiently low, reward providers 
will reward all contributors although they know that some of the contributors will not allocate 
rewards. However, if the cost of rewarding is too high, the reward providers may have an 
incentive to deviate by lowering their reward level. Does this imply that under the assumption 
of (8) we may observe an equilibrium in which all players contribute 0>g  to the joint 
project and reward providers reward each contributor? 
Proposition 6 Consider a community of Sn  players with 2'≥Sn  reward providers. Then there 
exists a pooling equilibrium (in contributions) in ReC in which all players contribute g  to the 
joint project and “reward providers” reward contributors with ∗ρ  on the equilibrium path. 
The intuition for the proof of Proposition 6 is as follows: In Proposition 4 (see also the proof 
in Appendix) we have shown that given the reward level is sufficiently high (i.e., equalizing 
contributors’ and free-riders’ payoffs) then each free-rider has an incentive also to contribute 
to the joint project in order to be rewarded. Provided that rewarding is sufficiently “cheap” 
and there are not “too many” free-riders – proposition 5 shows that a “reward provider” is 
ready to reward all contributors (with any ∗ρ ) even if there are some players who only 
contribute but not reward. Hence if reward providers choose the sufficient reward level, “free-
riders” will contribute (but not reward). Thus, a cooperation equilibrium with positive 
contributions exists in which all players contribute the same amount to the joint project on the 
equilibrium path and “reward providers” reward each contributor. 
Corollary 4 (a) If all players in ReC are conditional cooperators and 3Sn ≥ , then (8) is 
satisfied. This means that there exists an equilibrium as described in Proposition 6. (b) If ReC 
consists of conditional cooperators and free-riders, then 4≥Sn  has to be satisfied in order to 
achieve an equilibrium as described in Proposition 6. 
Corollary 4 (a) highlights that if all players are conditional cooperators then for almost all 
community sizes it is true that an equilibrium with positive contributions and positive rewards 
exist. Only in case of 2=Sn , there exist parameters for which an equilibrium with positive 
contributions exist, however not necessarily an equilibrium with positive contributions and 
positive rewards. Part (b) of the Corollary 4 states that in the presence of free-riders for 
3≤Sn  an equilibrium as described in Proposition 6 never exists. 
Corollary 5 Consider a community of Sn  players. Suppose that there are no reward providers 






 free-riders. Then in the unique equilibrium 
all players contribute 0=ig . 
If there are no reward providers then the situation in ReC is analogous to the situation in NSC, 
i.e., as if there were no possibilities to reward. This means, in particular, if there is a sufficient 
number of free-riders in ReC cooperation is impossible and 0=ig  is the unique equilibrium. 
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Summary for the equilibria in ReC 
We find that in ReC, separating equilibria with different contribution levels for different types 
do not exist (Proposition 4). On the other hand, in ReC, pooling equilibria (in contributions) 
with positive contributions are possible if there are a sufficient number of conditional 
cooperators who are ready to reward all contributors (Proposition 5). Cooperation equilibria 
may also exist if all players are conditional cooperators. 
We completed the analysis of the equilibria that can be played within different communities. 
The next section investigates the implications of the considerations above in our setting. 
2.3.6. Implications for our setting 
The predictions of our model depend on the distribution of the inequality parameters in the 
population. In the following, we investigate how likely the equilibria are, given specific 
distributions. In particular, we are interested to find out the different likelihoods of the 
cooperation equilibria in NSC, PuC, and ReC. To compute these likelihoods, we use two 
distributions of the inequality aversion parameters: the first distribution is the one used in FS 
(Table III on p. 844; henceforth, we refer to this distribution as the “FS distribution”). The FS 
distribution assumes an upper limit for the inequality parameter 6.0=iβ . For our setting, this 
means that cooperation equilibria cannot exist for 5≥θn  in any community since the 
condition for being a conditional cooperator 1)/( ≥+ inR βθ , which is the “basic” condition 
for any cooperation equilibrium in our model, is never satisfied. Hence, using the FS 
distribution, for all communities 5≥θn , our model predicts always defection, independent of 
the size and the composition of the communities. 
Fortunately, there exists a growing literature on the “other-regarding” preferences. In one of 
these studies Blanco et al. (2007) estimate the inequality preferences of subjects. A novel 
feature of this study is that it reports the joint distribution of the inequality parameters which 
is necessary to predict the behavior, especially in PuC and ReC. While the estimated iα ’s by 
Blanco et al. (2007) are mainly in line with the distribution of the same parameter by FS, the 
iβ ’s found by Blanco et al. (2007) tend to be larger than the ones assumed in FS.
14 In 
particular, Blanco et al. (2007) report that 11% of the subjects have 38.0>iβ  and 3% of 
them have even 1=iβ . In light of this finding, we adjust the FS preferences slightly, by 
replacing the maximal value 6.0=iβ  in FS with 87.0=iβ .
15 The reason to choose this 
specific parameter value is that it reflects the fact that the iβ ’s found by Blanco et al. (2007) 
are higher than iβ ’s  by FS but also because it guarantees that (at least) 40% of the population 
satisfies the condition for being a conditional cooperator, independent of the number of 
players in the community. This adjustment of the FS parameter distribution enables us to 
make predictions not only for 4≤θn  but for all community sizes. Table 2.1 depicts the 
preference distributions adopted by FS as well as the estimations of Blanco et al. (2007). 
                                                 
14 There is a similar study by Bellemare et al. (2007) that also reports higher iβ ’s than assumed by FS. 
15 We will refer to this distribution as the “adjusted FS parameters”. 
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Table 2.1: Distribution of inequality aversion preferences 
Distribution of αi’s Distribution of βi’s 
Fehr & Schmidt Blanco et al. Fehr & Schmidt Blanco et al. 
αi = 0 30% αi < 0.4 31% βi = 0 30% βi < 0.235 29% 
αi = 0.5 30% 0.4 ≤ αi < 0.92 33% βi = 0.25 30% 0.235 ≤ βi < 0.5 15% 
αi = 1 30% 0.92 ≤ αi < 4.5 23% 
αi = 4 10% 4.5 ≤ αi 13% 
βi = 0.6 40% 0.5 ≤ βi 56% 
 
Equilibria in NSC in our setting 
We already have shown that in our setting in NSC equilibria with 0>g  are only possible if 
and only if all players are conditional cooperators, i.e., if all players satisfy 1)/( ≥+ inR βθ . 
How likely is this given both distributions introduced above? Table 2.2 depicts the computed 
probabilities for the existence of a cooperation equilibrium using the FS distribution as well as 
the adjusted FS parameters. 
Table 2.2: Probability computation for cooperation in NSC 
nN Probability that a player i satisfies (R / nθ) + βi ≥ 1 Probability for a cooperation-equilibrium in NSC 
 FS distribution Adjusted FS FS distribution Adjusted FS 
2 .7 .7 .4900 .4900 
3 .4 .4 .0640 .0640 
4 .4 .4 .0256 .0256 
5 .0 .4 .0000 .0102 
6 .0 .4 .0000 .0041 
7 .0 .4 .0000 .0016 
8 .0 .4 .0000 .0007 
9 .0 .4 .0000 .0003 
10 .0 .4 .0000 .0001 
11 .0 .4 .0000 .0000 
12 .0 .4 .0000 .0000 
 
Independent of the distribution used, for 2=Nn , the probability for a cooperation equilibrium 
to exist amounts to 49%. However, for 2>Nn  the chances for cooperation sharply decrease. 
For just three players it is about 6.4% and for four players about 2.6%. As stated above, with 
FS parameters, cooperation in NSC is never possible for 5≥Nn . With the adjusted FS 
parameters, however, for communities with five or more members, there exist small but 
positive probabilities for cooperation. However, for all communities 5≥Nn , the chances for 
cooperation amount to not more than 1 %. To sum up, the chances for cooperation in the 
absence of any sanctioning mechanism are extremely low. A moderately high probability for 
cooperation exists only in case of 2=Nn . 
Equilibria in PuC in our setting 
Our considerations above have shown that a cooperation equilibrium in PuC in our setting 
exists either if all players are conditional cooperators or if – in the presence of at least one 
free-rider – the number of non-enforcers is strictly smaller than c/1  and there is at least one 
enforcer who cares sufficiently for disadvantageous inequality. Since 3/1=c  in our setting, 
the presence of two free-riders implies that all other players must be enforcers for a 
cooperative equilibrium to exist. The presence of one free-rider implies that at least all but 
one of the remaining players must be enforcers. 
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To be able to compute probabilities for cooperation in PuC we follow FS and assume a 
perfect correlation between iα ’s and iβ ’s. As FS already indicate this assumption is not fully 
realistic but it simplifies the analysis. The perfect correlation implies for the FS distribution, 
that all players with 1=iα  or 4=iα  are assumed to have 6.0=iβ  whereas players with 
0=iα  and 5.0=iα  are assumed to have 0=iβ  and 25.0=iβ , respectively. To have also a 
perfectly correlated adjusted FS distribution, we simply replace 6.0=iβ  with 87.0=iβ . 
For a given community size, there are three categories of compositions of players in PuC for 
which a cooperation equilibrium may occur: either (a) all players are conditional cooperators 
(with sufficiently high iβ ’s) or (b) there is 1'=− SS nn  one free-rider in PuC; in this case the 
remaining 'Sn  players must be enforcers whose lowest must be 5.0≥iα  for 2=Sn  and 
1≥iα  for 3≥Sn  or (c) there are 2'=− SS nn  free-riders in PuC (or one free-rider and one 
non-enforcer); in this case the remaining 'Sn  players must be enforcers with 4≥iα  for 
3≥Sn . Table 2.3 depicts the necessary number of enforcers and their associated inequality 
parameters for cooperation. In the last two columns of Table 2.3 the computed “total” 
probabilities for cooperation are depicted. These total numbers include all the probabilities 
resulting from the three possible categories of cooperation equilibria. 
Table 2.3: Probability computation for cooperation in PuC 
 
Lowest number of enforcers and lower 
bound of their αi’s for a cooperation-
equilibrium in PuC 
Probability that a player i has 
sufficiently high αi and βi  
 
nS  
If there is one free-
rider: nS – nS ' = 1 
If there are one free-
rider and one non-
enforcer or two free-
riders: 
nS – nS ' = 2 
nS – nS ' = 1 nS – nS ' = 2 
Probability for a 
cooperation-
equilibrium in PuC 
   FS Adjusted FS FS Adjusted FS FS Adjusted FS 
2 nS ' = 1, αi ≥ 0.5 - .7 .7 - - .9100 .9100 
3 nS ' = 2, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 1, αi = 4 .3 .3 .1 .1 .4600 .4600 
4 nS ' = 3, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 2 , αi = 4 .3 .3 .1 .1 .2008 .2008 
5 nS ' = 4, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 3 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0906 
6 nS ' = 5 , αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 4 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0402 
7 nS ' = 6, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 5 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0187 
8 nS ' = 7, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 6 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0085 
9 nS ' = 8, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 7 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0037 
10 nS ' = 9, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 8 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0017 
11 nS ' = 10, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 9 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0006 
12 nS ' = 11, αi ≥ 1 nS ' = 10 , αi = 4 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0003 
 
Independent of the parameter distribution, the probability for cooperation amounts to 20% or 
more for small communities ( 4≤Sn ). With FS distribution, cooperation in PuC is not 
possible for 4>Sn  (as in case of NSC). With the adjusted FS preferences, for 5≥Sn , the 
chances for cooperation amount to 10% or below, for larger communities ( 8≥Sn ) the 
probabilities for cooperation even decrease to 0.1% and lower. Hence, we can summarize as 
the prospects for cooperation in PuC as follows: for small communities there exist a 
considerable probability for cooperation whereas for large communities the chances for 
cooperation are extremely low. 
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Equilibria in ReC in our setting 
We found that in ReC, pooling equilibria (in contributions) with positive contributions are 
possible if there are a sufficient number of reward providers. Cooperation equilibria also exist 
if all players are conditional cooperators. 
In Table 2.4, the lowest number of reward providers (conditional cooperators) that is 
necessary for a cooperation equilibrium is depicted. As in case of PuC we assume a perfect 
correlation between iα ’s and iβ ’s. The total probabilities for cooperation are depicted in the 
last two columns. Independent of the distribution of parameters, for 2=Sn , the probability 
for a cooperation equilibrium amounts to 49%. For small communities, the chances for 
cooperation are below 10%. With the FS distribution, cooperation in ReC is not possible for 
4>Sn  (as in case of NSC and PuC). With the adjusted FS parameters, the probabilities 
remain well below 10% for 5≥Sn . Hence, in our setting, the possibility to reward does not 
considerably improve the chances for cooperation though – compared to NSC and PuC – for 
larger communities the prospects for cooperation are slightly better. 
Table 2.4: Probability computation for cooperation in ReC 
 
Lowest number of reward 
providers and their αi’s for a 
cooperation equilibrium in ReC 
Probability that a player has sufficiently high 
αi and βi 
Probability for a 
cooperation-equilibrium in 
ReC 
 αi = 1 αi = 4 αi = 1 αi = 4 αi = 1 αi = 4   
nS   FS Adjusted FS FS Adjusted FS FS Adjusted FS
2 nS ' = 2 nS ' = 2 .6 .6 .1 .1 .4900 .4900 
3 nS ' = 3 nS ' = 3 .3 .3 .1 .1 .0640 .0640 
4 nS ' = 3 nS ' = 4 .3 .3 .1 .1 .0904 .0904 
5 nS ' = 4 nS ' = 5 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0345 
6 nS ' = 4 nS ' = 6 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0712 
7 nS ' = 5 nS ' = 7 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0292 
8 nS ' = 5 nS ' = 7 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0580 
9 nS ' = 6 nS ' = 8 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0253 
10 nS ' = 6 nS ' = 9 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0474 
11 nS ' = 7 nS ' = 10 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0216 
12 nS ' = 8 nS ' = 11 .0 .3 .0 .1 .0000 .0095 
 
2.3.7. Community choice equilibria 
Now we relax the assumption of isolated communities and look for equilibria in an 
environment in which each member can freely choose between communities. Are there 
equilibria in which both communities are simultaneously populated, and if so with different 
contribution levels? Or, are there only equilibria in which one community is depopulated? To 
approach these questions we assume that in each of both communities an equilibrium is 
played. We seek for stable allocations where no individual player has an incentive to deviate 
from his strategy by choosing the other community. As FS, we assume that players have 
individual parameters for inequality aversion which neither change over time nor are they 
influenced by the parameters of the other players. However, remember that the MPCR of a 
community depends on the number of players in that community ( θθ nRa /= ). By choosing a 
community, a player increases θn  and thus reduces θa  of that community. As a consequence, 
a player’s “type” may depend on the community choice of the player as well as of the other 
players. For example, player i  may be a free-rider in case i  joins NSC because 
1/ <+ iNnR β , whereas the same player may be a conditional cooperator in case i  joins PuC 
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because 1/ ≥+ iSnR β , or vice versa. Moreover, even other players’ types may depend on the 
choice of player i  since their types also depend on θa . Hence, when making the community 
choice, a player has to consider the consequences for equilibrium play. This is a specialty of 
our design which may appear counterintuitive when not only the parameters iα  and iβ  but 
also the types are understood as hard-wired characteristics of a player. A deeper reflection, 
however, shows that it is appropriate to consider the types as being variable, because the term 
inR βθ +/  reflects the sum of the monetary payoff and the utility gain from avoiding 
advantageous inequality. In one community, the monetary payoff θnR /  may be sufficient to 
compensate an investment of one token whereas in the other community the MPCR is too low 
to compensate this investment. Hence, in one community the player appears as a conditional 
cooperator whereas in the other community the same player acts as free-rider. 
To simplify the analysis of the equilibria under community choice, we assume that there is 
only one level of cooperation in equilibrium in each of both communities which is in 
particular independent of θn . We denote the equilibrium level of cooperation in NSC by 
0>∗Ng  and the equilibrium level of cooperation in PuC (and ReC, respectively) by 0>
∗
Sg . 
Yet, we do not make any assumption about the relationship between ∗Ng  and 
∗
Sg , because 
Corollary 2, Proposition 2, and Proposition 6 showed that in equilibrium cooperation is 
possible on various levels yg ≤≤ ∗0 . 
Definition 
1. A defection equilibrium is an equilibrium in NSC, PuC, or ReC with the properties 
described in Corollary 1, Proposition 3, and Corollary 5, respectively. In a defection 
equilibrium all players contribute 0=∗θg  on the equilibrium path. 
2. A cooperation equilibrium is an equilibrium in NSC, PuC, or ReC with the properties 
described in Corollary 2, Proposition 1, and Proposition 6. In a cooperation equilibrium all 
players contribute 0≥∗θg  on the equilibrium path. 
3. A community choice equilibrium is a stable allocation of the players to two communities 
with the property that a cooperation equilibrium and/or a defection equilibrium is played 
in each of both communities and no player has an incentive to deviate from his or her 
community choice. 
In the following, we analyze first the community choice equilibria in PUN, i.e., when the 
choice is between NSC and PuC. 
Community choice equilibria in PUN 
The following allocations of the players to NSC and PuC and respective contribution levels 
(as listed in Table 2.5) can be sustained by a community choice equilibrium provided that the 
indicated conditions are satisfied. 








(see Corollary 1). 
2. Cooperation equilibrium played in NSC: In NSC, all players are conditional cooperators 
(see Corollary 2). 
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3. Defection equilibrium played in PuC: In PuC, there exists no enforcer ( 0'=Sn ) and there 






1−  free-riders (see Proposition 3). 
4. Cooperation equilibrium played in PuC: In PuC, there exist 0'>Sn  enforcers (see 
Proposition 1). 
5. For all players in PuC it must hold: If this player deviates from PuC to NSC then a 
cooperation equilibrium in NSC is not possible. This means if a player in PuC chooses 








≥  (see Corollary 1). 
6. For all players in NSC it must hold: If this player deviates from NSC to PuC then a 
cooperation equilibrium in PuC is not possible. If a player in NSC chooses PuC instead 








<  (Proposition 1). 
Conditions 1-4 guarantee that behavior in each community is stable. Additionally, we have to 
make sure that no player has an incentive to switch from one community to the other which is 
given by conditions 5 and 6. Feasible combinations of these conditions characterize the 
community choice equilibria. The intuitions for these are provided in the following. 
Community choice equilibria a)-d): Only one of the two communities is populated and all 
players either play a defection or a cooperation equilibrium. In either case, no player has an 
incentive to change to the depopulated community because a single player is not able to 
contribute to a joint project. 
Community choice equilibrium e): Both communities are populated and in both communities 
a cooperation equilibrium is played with equal contributions. By assumption, in the 
cooperation-equilibrium players’ contributions do not depend on the number of players in 
their community. This means that if a member of one community would deviate from his or 
her community choice to join the other community, this would not change the contributions 
(in the “new” cooperation equilibrium) in the other community. Thus, no player in any 
community has an incentive to deviate from his or her community choice. 
Community choice equilibria f) and g): A cooperation equilibrium is played in NSC and in 
PuC, however with different contribution levels. In that case players would have an incentive 
to deviate from the community with the lower contribution level to the community with the 
higher contributions, if the cooperation equilibrium would still be played after deviating. Parts 
f) and g) describe the conditions under which different equilibrium contribution levels 
constitute a community choice equilibrium, by specifying the conditions that the cooperation 
equilibrium with the higher contributions is no longer possible if a player deviates. 
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Table 2.5: Community choice equilibria in PUN 
 
One of the 
communities is 
depopulated 
































































































 a b c d e f g h i j k l 
Number of players in NSC nN  N N 0 0 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 
Contribution level in NSC gN 0 ≥ 0 – – ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0 0 0 > 0 0 0 
Number of players in PuC nS 0 0 N N ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 
Contribution level in PuC gS – – 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0 ≥ 0 > 0 0 0 0 0 


































Conditions             
1. Defection-equilibrium played in NSC ×       × ×   × 
2. Cooperation-equilibrium played in NSC  ×   × × ×   × ×  
3. Defection-equilibrium played in PuC   ×       × × × 
4. Cooperation-equilibrium played in PuC    × × × × × ×    
5. For all players in PuC it must hold: If this player deviates 
from PuC to NSC then a cooperation-equilibrium in NSC is not 
possible.  
      × × × ×  × 
6. For all players in NSC it must hold: If this player deviates 
from NSC to PuC then a cooperation-equilibrium in PuC is not 
possible. 
     ×  ×  × × × 
 
Community choice equilibria h) and j): Part h) describes the situation that a defection 
equilibrium is played in NSC and a cooperation-equilibrium with 0≥∗Sg  is played in PuC. In 
that case players would have an incentive to deviate from NSC to PuC, if the cooperation 
equilibrium in PuC is still possible despite deviation of members of NSC. Hence, to be h) a 
community choice equilibrium, for all players in NSC it must hold that if this player deviates 
from NSC to PuC then a cooperation equilibrium in PuC is not possible (anymore). On the 
other hand, a deviation from PuC to NSC could possibly lead to a (new) cooperation-
equilibrium in NSC with higher contributions than in PuC. Thus, it is also required that if a 
player deviates from PuC to NSC then a cooperation equilibrium in NSC is (still) not 
possible. A similar line of argument can be applied to part j) of the proposition. 
Community choice equilibria i) and k): Part i) describes the situation that a defection 
equilibrium is played in NSC and a cooperation equilibrium with 0=∗Sg  is played in PuC. In 
this case no player has an incentive to deviate from NSC to PuC since 0=∗Sg . On the other 
hand, a deviation from PuC to NSC could possibly lead to a cooperation equilibrium in NSC 
with 0>∗Ng . Hence, to be i) a community choice equilibrium, for all players in PuC holds 
that a cooperation equilibrium in NSC is (still) not possible if the player deviates from PuC to 
NSC. A similar line of argument applies to part k) of the proposition. 
Community choice equilibrium l): A defection-equilibrium is played in NSC and in PuC. This 
means a deviation from PuC to NSC (and vice versa) could possibly lead to a cooperation-
equilibrium in NSC (or in PuC, respectively). In order for this situation to be a community-
choice-equilibrium there must be no incentive to deviate in either direction. Thus, for all 
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players in NSC it must hold that if this player deviates from NSC to PuC then a cooperation-
equilibrium in PuC is (still) not possible and vice versa. 
Community choice equilibria in REW 
The following allocations of the players to NSC and ReC and respective contribution levels 
(as listed in Table 2.6) can be sustained by a community choice equilibrium provided that the 
marked conditions are satisfied. Explicitly, the conditions are as follows: 








(see Corollary 1). 
2. Cooperation-equilibrium played in NSC: In NSC, all players are conditional cooperators 
(see Corollary 2). 
3. Defection-equilibrium played in ReC: In ReC, there exists no reward provider ( 0'=Sn ) 






1−  free-riders (see Corollary 5). 
4. Cooperation-equilibrium played in ReC: In ReC, there exist 0'>Sn  reward providers (see 
Proposition 5) and 'SS nn −  free-riders with sufficiently low iβ ’s (see Proposition 6). 
5. For all players in ReC it must hold: If this player deviates from ReC to NSC then a 
cooperation-equilibrium in NSC is not possible. If a player in ReC chooses NSC instead 







(see Corollary 1). 
6. For all players in NSC it must hold: If this player deviates from NSC to ReC then a 
cooperation-equilibrium in ReC is not possible. If a player in NSC chooses ReC instead 













 (see Proposition 6). 
Analogous to PUN, conditions 1-4 guarantee that behavior in each community of REW is 
stable. Conditions 5 and 6 make sure that no player has an incentive to switch from ReC to 
NSC and vice versa. Feasible combinations of these conditions characterize the community 
choice equilibria. The intuitions for these equilibria are analogous to those provided for PUN. 
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Table 2.6: Community choice equilibria in REW 
 
One of the 
communities is 
depopulated 






























































































 a b c d e f g h i j k l 
Number of players in NSC N N 0 0 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 
Contribution level in NSC 0 ≥ 0 – – ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0 0 0 > 0 0 0 
Number of players in ReC 0 0 N N ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 1 
Contribution level in ReC – – 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0 ≥ 0 > 0 0 0 0 0 
Reward level ρ*  ≥ 0  ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0    

































Conditions             
1. Defection-equilibrium played in NSC ×       × ×   × 
2. Cooperation-equilibrium played in NSC  ×   × × ×   × ×  
3. Defection-equilibrium played in ReC   ×       × × × 
4. Cooperation-equilibrium played in ReC    × × × × × ×    
5. For all players in ReC it must hold: If this player deviates 
from ReC to NSC then a cooperation-equilibrium in NSC is not 
possible.  
      × × × ×  × 
6. For all players in NSC it must hold: If this player deviates 
from NSC to ReC then a cooperation-equilibrium in ReC is not 
possible. 
     ×  ×  × × × 
 
Community choice equilibria in our setting 
In our setting, all community choice equilibria for PUN and REW described above are 
theoretically possible. However, the probabilities for the existence of the equilibria depend on 
the (actual) distribution of players’ inequality parameters. To calculate the probabilities for 
these equilibria we conduct two simulations for PUN and REW based on 1 million iterations. 
In each iteration, we randomly draw iα ’s and iβ 's for all players according to the FS 
distribution. For the drawn parameters we verify the equilibrium conditions specified in Table 
2.5 and Table 2.6, respectively. Table 2.7 depicts the percentage of cases where conditions for 
the respective equilibria are satisfied.16 
Community choice equilibria in PUN can only be found with substantial probabilities in cases 
in which defection is played in both communities, i.e., in equilibrium i) for low occupations in 
PuC and in equilibria l), and k) for 10=Sn , except for the degenerated cases in which only 
one community is populated, i.e., equilibria a) and c). A very similar picture emerges in 
REW. Thus, most likely we have to expect defection in both communities in both treatments 
of our experiment. 
                                                 
16 Due to space restrictions we report only the results of simulations basing on the FS parameter distribution. We 
conducted also simulations with adjusted FS preferences. However, their results are not significantly different. 
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Table 2.7: Probability calculation for the community choice equilibria in PUN and REW 
 One of the communities is depopulated Both communities are populated 
PUN Defect. in NSC 




Coop.  in 
PuC 
Coop. in NSC 
Coop. in PuC 
Defect. in NSC
Coop. in PuC 
Coop. in NSC 
Defect. in PuC 
Defect. in NSC
Defect. in PuC 
 a b c d e f g h i j k l 
Conditions to be 
satisfied: 1 2 3 4 2,4 2,4,6 2,4,5 1,4,5,6 1,4,5 2,3,5,6 2,3,6 1,3,5,6 
nS nN             
0 12 1.0000 .0000 - - - - - - - - - - 
1 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 10 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .0979 .9093 .0000 .0000 .0314 
3 9 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .0456 .4597 .0001 .0002 .5401 
4 8 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .0122 .2012 .0001 .0006 .7981 
5 7 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .0042 .0905 .0001 .0015 .9078 
6 6 - - - - .0002 .0000 .0000 .0023 .0413 .0002 .0040 .9545 
7 5 - - - - .0002 .0000 .0000 .0015 .0187 .0003 .0101 .9710 
8 4 - - - - .0002 .0000 .0000 .0012 .0083 .0004 .0253 .9662 
9 3 - - - - .0003 .0002 .0000 .0034 .0036 .0006 .0638 .9324 
10 2 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .3310 .4896 .5103 
11 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
12 0 - - 1.0000 .0000 - - - - - - - - 







Coop. in NSC 
Coop. in ReC 
Defect. in NSC
Coop. in ReC 
Coop. in NSC 
Defect. in ReC 
Defect. in NSC
Defect. in ReC 
 a b c d e f g h i j k l 
Conditions to be 
satisfied: 1 2 3 4 2,4 2,4,6 2,4,5 1,4,5,6 1,4,5 2,3,5,6 2,3,6 1,3,5,6 
nS nN             
0 12 1.0000 .0000 - - - - - - - - - - 
1 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 10 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .3311 .4900 .0000 .0001 .5099 
3 9 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0006 .0637 .0001 .0003 .9361 
4 8 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0004 .0255 .0001 .0006 .9739 
5 7 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0003 .0102 .0001 .0016 .9882 
6 6 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0002 .0040 .0002 .0040 .9920 
7 5 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0016 .0003 .0101 .9883 
8 4 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0006 .0004 .0255 .9739 
9 3 - - - - .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0003 .0006 .0640 .9357 
10 2 - - - - .0001 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .3303 .4889 .5110 
11 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
12 0 - - 1.0000 .0000 - - - - - - - - 
 
2.4. Experimental Design and Procedure 
Following the model described in Section 2 our experimental design consists of two 
treatments that differ with respect to the communities available in the choice set (see Table 
2.8). 
Table 2.8: Experimental Treatments 
Treatment Co-existing communities # Members in a community # Independent observations 
PUN NSC and PuC 120 ≤≤ θn  8 
REW NSC and ReC 120 ≤≤ θn  6 
 
In each treatment N = 12 players constitute a population that remains constant during the 
whole session. In each session one of the two games described in Section 2 is repeated over 
30 rounds. By randomly reshuffling the presentation ordering on the computer screens we 
made sure that the identity of the players could not be traced over rounds. Since players can 
choose between communities },{ SN∈θ  the community size θn  may vary in each round.
17 
                                                 
17 In our experiment we consider a special case of a partner design in which not all members of the group 
necessarily interact in each round. For an investigation of the differences in behavior of strangers and partners in 
social dilemma situations see e.g. Croson (1996) or Keser and van Winden (2000). 
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To compare the success of the two communities, the productivity factor R is kept constant and 
therefore the MPCR θa  varies with θn . As in many other experimental studies we set 
6.1=R . Table 2.9 shows the corresponding θa ’s in our experimental design dependent on 
θn . It is worth noting that the threat of punishment and the opportunities to be rewarded is 
likely to be heavier in larger groups, as in total there are more punishment respective reward 
tokens available. 
Table 2.9: Marginal per Capita Return a(n) 
Community size n 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Marginal per Capita Return a(n) 0.80 0.53 0.40 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 
 
The experiment was conducted in the computerized laboratory eLab of the University Erfurt. 
The subjects were recruited for voluntary participation on campus. All subjects were 
undergraduate students. Each subject was allowed to participate only once and none had 
participated in a similar experiment before. The experiment was programmed and conducted 
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Communication other than via the experimental 
software was not allowed.18 
In the experiment a total of 168 subjects participated in 7 sessions with 24 subjects each. Each 
session contained two independent observations: In total we have 8 independent observations 
for PUN and 6 for REW. Before starting the experiment the instructions were read aloud to all 
participants.19 The subjects were informed about the experimental procedure as well as the 
number of rounds. One session lasted for about 2 to 2.5 hours. The subjects earned between 
15 to 25 Euros and payments were made anonymously at the end of the experiment. 
2.5. Results 
In this section we report our experimental findings. First we address the initial community 
choice and contribution behavior. We continue by investigating the development of the 
community choice, contributions, and efficiency within the communities and between the 
treatments. Then, we compare the theoretical predictions to our experimental findings. An in-
depth analysis of the community choice behavior and its effects on contributions follow. The 
conclusion section summarizes our main findings and provides a discussion. 
2.5.1. Community choice and the contributions in the first period 
The initial choice of community differs between settings (see Table 2.10). More than two 
thirds (68.8%) of the subjects prefer NSC if the alternative is PuC. In contrast, if ReC is the 
alternative, more than three fourth of the participants opt for the ReC (76.4%).20 Thus, the 
first observation supports the unequal choice frequencies between PuC and NSC and exhibits 
a clear direction, namely the avoidance of the punishment threat. The second observation 
reveals a clear affinity towards the reward mechanism. 
                                                 
18 On the influence of communication and (non-binding) promises on contribution behavior in social dilemmas 
see Isaac and Walker (1988a), Orbell et al. (1988), and Ostrom et al. (1992), Brosig et al. (2002). 
19 A translation of the instruction sheet is given in Appendix. Original instructions were written in German. They 
are available upon request from the authors. 
20 Binomial tests show that significantly more subjects choose NSC than PuC (p = 0.000) and more subjects 
prefer ReC to NSC (p = 0.000), respectively. The reported non-parametric statistical tests are two-tailed if not 
stated otherwise and use the session averages as independent observations. 
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Table 2.10: Community choice and average contributions in the first period 
Treatment Non-Sanctioning Community (NSC) Sanctioning Community (PuC / ReC) 
 Percentage of subjects choosing the 
PUN 68.8 31.2 
REW 23.6 76.4 
 Average contributions in… 
 NSC PuC / ReC 
PUN 7.4 13.2 
REW 2.7 7.9 
 Percentage of contributions in… 
 g ≤ 5 5 < g < 15 15 ≤ g  g ≤ 5 5 < g < 15 15 ≤ g  
PUN 43.7 42.2 14.1 18.4 27.9 53.7 
REW 93.3 6.7 0.0 47.9 35.5 16.6 
 
In both treatments the initial contributions are higher in the sanctioning communities than in 
the NSCs. This is true for PUN (U-Test, p = 0.016) as well as for REW (p = 0.063). The 
highest first period contributions are made by the subjects who join PuC. They contribute on 
average 13.2 tokens, (66% of the endowment). Initial contributions in ReC are significantly 
lower than the contributions in PuC (U-Test, p = 0.003). More than half of the subjects 
(53.7%) who choose PuC in the first period contribute 15 tokens or more. In contrast, only 
18.4% of subjects in PuC are free-riders, i.e., they contribute 5 tokens or less. In ReC only 
16.6% of subjects contribute high while almost half of the subjects who opt for ReC in the 
first period are free-riders (47.9%). Initially, the contributions in NSC of PUN are clearly 
higher than the contributions in NSC of REW (U-Test, p = 0.002) since almost all subjects 
(93.3%) who choose NSC in REW are free-riders whereas in NSC of PUN only 43.7% of 
subjects are free-riders. 
2.5.2. Evolution of community choice and contributions 
The development of the community choices is displayed in Figure 2.1: Panel a) displays the 
percentage of subjects in the two communities of PUN in the course of the rounds. Panel b) 
displays this data for REW. In PUN, the initial low acceptance of PuC increases steadily with 
an almost complete extinction of NSC towards the end of the interaction. In the final rounds, 
more than 90% join PuC.21 In REW, in contrast, the number of subjects in both communities 
is rather constant over the whole experiment.22 
                                                 
21 In each of the eight independent observations of PUN the number of members in NSC has a negative trend 
over time (determined by Spearman-rank-correlation coefficients). Hence a binomial test with these correlation 
coefficients clearly rejects that a negative trend is as likely as a positive trend (p = 0.016). 
22 For one of the six independent observations of REW the number of members in NSC has a negative trend over 
time, in the remaining five observations no trend can be found. 
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Figure 2.1 Community choice over periods 
One of the most important questions regarding social dilemmas concerns the induced 
contribution behavior. Table 2.11 summarizes the contribution levels in the different 
treatments and communities, over all 30 periods as well as separately for the first and the 
second half. Additionally contributions of the first and the last round are shown. Averaged 
over 30 periods, the contributions in PUN are significantly higher than in REW (U-Test, p = 
0.043).23 
Table 2.11: Average Contributions 
Treatment Periods 1-30 Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30 First Period Last Period 
PUN 14.5 10.9 18.1 9.2 18.3 
REW 9.8 11.2 8.3 6.7 6.8 
 Communities 










PUN 3.6 18.7 3.6 17.0 3.4 19.5 7.4 13.2 0.2 20.0 
REW 5.3 10.1 7.0 11.5 4.4 8.6 2.7 7.9 0.6 7.0 
 
Within each treatment NSC performs worst; it exhibits significantly lower contributions than 
the alternative community that allows an influence of the other subjects’ payoffs. A Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs test show that the contributions in PuC are significantly higher than in NSC in 
PUN (p = 0.008) whereas contributions in ReC are not significantly higher than NSC in REW 
(p = 0.125).24 A comparison of all communities shows that the highest contributions are 
observed in PuC, where, on average, subjects contribute 93.5% of their endowment. 
As Figure 2.1, Panel a) shows the members of PuC reach almost full cooperation towards the 
end of the interaction period although the communities are quite large in the final third (about 
9 to 12 players) and as a consequence the MPCR is relatively low.25 Over time, we observe a 
                                                 
23 This observation is well in line with the results of other studies, e.g., Sefton et al. (forthcoming). 
24 Actually, in REW, in four of five observations, contributions are considerably higher in ReC than in NSC. In 
only one observation, subjects slightly contribute more in NSC than in ReC. In the sixth observation, all subjects 
but one always opt for ReC, thus we cannot include this observation for the test. 
25 Compared to previous research by Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Sefton et al. (forthcoming) the contribution 
levels in PuC are extremely high. This is especially noteworthy since it is has been shown in previous studies 
(e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988b) that cooperative behavior is much more difficult to establish if the community 
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clear increase in contributions in PuC whereas there is a decreasing trend ReC. The 
contributions in the second half increase significantly in PuC (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.008) 
whereas they decrease in ReC (p = 0.031).  This finding supports the conjecture that the 
punishment possibility is a more effective mechanism for achieving cooperation in social 
dilemmas than the pure reward mechanism. However, the most striking result is that the 
members of PuC establish and maintain an almost perfect cooperation. In the second half, 
members of this community contribute on average 97.5% of their endowment. We observe no 
trend in the non-sanctioning communities. This is mainly due to sparse data since in the 
second half only very few subjects inhabit NSC in PUN. 
Especially in PUN, there is a surprisingly clear differentiation in last round contributions of 
PuC and NSC. In the very last round of the experiment, members of PuC contribute virtually 
their complete endowment (100%)26 whereas in NSC almost everything is kept in the private 
account (99%). Hence, we do not observe an endgame effect in PuC; in contrast, the 
contributions even rise. Without exception, all subjects in NSC in all treatments free ride 
( 5≤g ) in the last period. In ReC, the great majority (60.3%) free ride whereas there exist 
some subjects (36.5%) who also contribute high ( 15≥g ). In NSC of REW, all subjects free-
ride in the last period. 
2.5.3. Payoffs and Efficiency 
Figure 2.2 displays the development of the payoffs over the rounds for each treatment and for 
reasons of comparison it indicates the two benchmarks (social optimum and Nash 
equilibrium). An interesting observation is that in the first half of the experiment the payoffs 
in PuC are lower than in NSC (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.148). The higher initial contributions in 
PuC are “eaten up” by the higher expenses for punishment.27 Hence, changing to PuC cannot 
be attributed to choosing the community that generates the highest average short-run payoff. 
Actually, we observe that in the first half of the experiment almost 40% of all changes from 
NSC to PuC are made although the last round average payoff in PuC is lower than in NSC. A 
change to the less profitable PuC cannot be explained by the prospect of higher future payoffs 
because subjects are free to change at any time in the game and they might also wait until the 
free riding diminishes. Joining PuC in the early stages with high contributions and high 
punishment expenses thus means the contribution to two joint projects with public good 
properties: to the joint project in Stage 1 of that period and to cooperation enforcement 
(second order public good) via punishment. 
However, in the second half of the experiment the average payoff in PuC steadily increases 
towards the social optimum. In PuC, the payoffs in the second half of the experiment are 
significantly higher than in the first half (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.008). The payoffs in NSC 
remain constantly low from beginning and approach the Nash equilibrium in the end (p = 
0.219). The payoffs in both communities of REW follow a clear decreasing trend. Payoffs fall 
significantly in ReC (p = 0.031). As in NSC of PUN, the decrease in NSC of REW is not 
significant (p = 0.125) since here the payoffs rapidly decrease already in the early phase of the 
experiment. 
                                                                                                                                                        
size is higher and the MPCR is low. Carpenter (2007), however, observes that cooperation is not necessarily 
reduced with an increasing group size if mutual monitoring and punishment possibilities are available.  
26 In that round, 88 out of 96 subjects who participated in PUN join PuC. 87 out of that 88 subjects contribute 20 
in that round, the other one 19. 
27 This observation is in accordance to previous research (Sefton et al., forthcoming, Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
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Figure 2.2 Payoffs and efficiency over periods 
A social planner may be interested in the question which of the proposed treatments generates 
the highest social welfare. In the social optimum in PUN, each player fully contributes and 
refrains from punishing. This results in a payoff of 52 for each player, independent of the 
community size. In REW, however, rewarding is efficiency enhancing. Thus allocation of all 
rewarding tokens between the community members is socially optimal. In this case, the 
payoff of each player amounts to 92 tokens. Full contribution, however, does not constitute a 
Nash-equilibrium in either case. In the Nash equilibrium each player completely free rides 
and refrains from punishing and rewarding. This results in a payoff of 40 independent of the 
community and its size. We measure the cooperative efficiency (efficiency resulting from 
cooperation) as the ratio of the actually achieved surplus (Actual payoff – Nash Equilibrium) 
and the maximum possible surplus (Socially optimal payoff – Nash Equilibrium). In the 
second half of the experiment, in PUN, the cooperative efficiency amounts to 67.2% while it 
is only 17.7% in REW (U-Test, p = 0.003). Thus, the society offering the punishment 
community as an alternative performs best in the long run. 
2.5.4. The comparison of theoretical predictions with experimental 
findings 
To obtain further insights into the reasons why contribution behavior is so remarkably 
different in different communities, in the following we contrast the overall contribution 
behavior observed in the experiment to the predictions of the theoretical analysis. First, we 
investigate the PUN treatment. 
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Community choice in PUN 
In the long-run, the most frequently observed situation in PUN is that a very small group of 
subjects inhabit NSC and defect while almost all subject are members of PuC and cooperate. 
This observation corresponds to the community choice equilibrium h) from Table 2.5 in 
which a defection equilibrium is played in NSC while a cooperation equilibrium is played 
with 0>g  in PuC. However, for one of the most frequent allocations observed in our 
experiment 10=Sn , the likelihood of equilibrium h) is below 0.01%. Thus, there is a striking 
difference between what we observe in PuC and what the theory predicts. In order to study 
this discrepancy more deeply, we will analyze the “evolution” of cooperation within PuC. 
In the early phase of the experiment, i.e., in the first five periods, on average, 7.7 subjects 
choose NSC while 4.3 opt for PuC. If players’ inequality parameters are distributed as in the 
adjusted FS distribution then for communities with 8=Nn  and 4=Sn  the theory predicts that 
cooperation is virtually never possible in NSC (likelihood below 1%) whereas in PuC the 
chances for cooperation are about 20%. Actually, however, in the early phase of the 
experiment, the cooperation rate, i.e., the percentage of endowment invested, amounts to 
70.9% in PuC whereas it is 12.7% in NSC. In PuC, 45.6% of all contributions are full 
contributions (g = 20) and 68.6% are high contributions (15 ≤ g). While 69.2% of 
contributions in NSC are low contributions (g ≤ 5), 38.3% of them are even equal to zero. 
Thus, full contribution in PuC and zero contributions in NSC are the modal contributions. 
Hence, in the early phase, the experimental findings correspond to a certain extent to the 
theoretical predictions. 
In PuC, the community size increases over the course of the rounds as Figure 2.1, panel a) 
shows. According to the theory, the probability for a cooperation-equilibrium in PuC should 
decrease when the community size increases. In the last five periods of the experiment, on 
average 11.2 subjects choose PuC. For such high occupations, the theory predicts virtually no 
cooperation (below 1%). However, the actual cooperation rate amounts to 98.4% in PuC. In 
the last period, we even observe perfect cooperation (all subjects contribute fully) in seven of 
the eight communities. In the eighth community; all but one subject contribute 20. How can 
this clear discrepancy between the experimental results and the theoretical predictions be 
explained? 
According to the theory, a player j  is ready to punish free-riders if j ’s “gains” from 
punishment outweigh the monetary costs of punishment c  that j  must bear (see condition (7) 
from Proposition 1). Thus, theoretically, for j  it gets more and more difficult to satisfy the 
condition (7) the greater the number of the players in the community Sn  gets. This means, a 
certain player j  may satisfy the condition (7) for relatively small Sn , while the same player 
may not satisfy (7) when Sn  increases. In the latter case, free-riders may not sufficiently 
threatened by punishment and thus have an incentive to deviate to lower contributions. 
Figure 2.3, panel a) shows the percentage of players who punish low contributors (i.e., 
percentage of players who punish others who contribute lower) dependent on the community 
size. The theory predicts for the cost parameter used in our experiment ( 3/1=c ) that we 
should expect 10% or more punishers for small communities 4≤Sn ; for larger communities 
(as Sn  grows) the chances for the existence of punishers diminish rapidly towards zero. 
However, in our experiment, we observe a completely different picture. For 2=Sn , the 
percentage of punishers in the experiment is much lower than predicted by the theory. This 
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could be due to the very rare occurrence of this occupation in our experiment. For 3≥Sn , 
however, we observe that the percentage of punishers are much higher than predicted by the 
theory. Moreover, there is no decrease in the percentage of punishers when Sn  increases. 
Actually, for 3≥Sn , roughly 50% of subjects are punishers independent of Sn . Additionally, 
Figure 2.3, panel b) shows that the percentage of punishers remains relatively stable over 
time. Apparently, there are much more subjects who are ready to punish low contributors than 
predicted by the theory. How can we explain this? 
 
Figure 2.3 Percentage of subjects in PuC who punish low contributors 
De Quervain et al. (2004) show that punishing norm violations may induce satisfaction for the 
punisher since punishment activates brain regions which are related to processing of 
“rewards”. Moreover, subjects with a stronger activation are ready to spent more money on 
punishment. In light of this finding, one may hypothesize that some subjects may obtain 
additional utility from punishment that may be not appropriately reflected by the inequality 
aversion theory.  Thus, for these subjects, the “actual costs” of punishing may be lower than 
the monetary costs of punishment. Can this be a source of explanation? Let us for a moment 
assume that there exist such subjects. How low must these actual costs be to have a 
considerable probability for a cooperation equilibrium? We set the punishment cost parameter 
extremely low 10/1=c  which makes punishing others extremely cheap. Figure 2.3, panel a) 
shows that this variation of c  increases the theoretical predictions for the percentage of 
punishers. However, for large communities ( 10≥Sn ), which we frequently observe in our 
experiment, the change in predictions are extremely small. Thus, the variation of c has 
virtually no effect on the theoretical probability for the existence of punishers and hence also 
on the probability for the existence of a cooperation equilibrium in PuC. 
Do subjects possibly have inequality parameters higher than assumed in the FS distribution as 
well as in the adjusted FS and can these high parameters be “responsible” for the increased 
cooperation observed in the experiment? All other things held constant, a player j  satisfies 
condition (7) the easier, the larger player j ’s jα  and jβ  are. Let us assume that some 
subjects have larger jα ’s and jβ ’s than in the adjusted FS distribution. Would this increase 
the theoretical probability for punishers in large communities? According to the FS model jβ  
must be lower than 1. To give cooperation the best chance let us assume that those players 
with the highest jα  and jβ  combination shall have 99.0=jβ . According to the adjusted FS 
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distribution the fraction of players with the highest disadvantageous inequality parameter 
possess 4=jα . What happens if we increase their jα ? The right-hand side of the condition 
(7) converges to )'/(1 SS nn −  as jα  goes to infinity. Hence, for ∞→jα  the condition (7) 
can be then stated as )'/(1 SS nnc −<  which is equivalent to )/1(' cnn SS <−  for 0'>− SS nn . 
Thus, the effect of increasing jα  on the number of punishers is limited by the cost parameter. 
This means, the cost parameter determines the maximum number of punishers, hence also the 
number of free-riders in a community (see also Corollary 3). Hence, “adjusting” the 
inequality parameters does not considerably increase the percentage of punishers predicted by 
the theory. 
To summarize: for communities that are frequently observed in PUN, the variations of c and 
the inequality parameters do not significantly increase the chances for the existence of the 
community-choice-equilibrium h). For 10=Sn , the probability for the existence of the 
equilibrium h) is never greater than 0.3%. Hence, the long-run allocations observed in PUN 
cannot be explained by the theory. 
Community choice in REW 
Now we contrast the theoretical predictions to the observed behavior in REW. In the long run, 
the most frequently observed situation in REW is defection in NSC and cooperation on a low 
level in ReC. This scenario corresponds to the community choice equilibrium h) from Table 
2.6. Hence, theoretically, for one of the most frequently observed situations in our 
experiment, a community choice equilibrium with 10=Sn  in ReC has a probability of zero. 
In the first five periods, on average, 10.7 subjects choose ReC while 1.3 subjects opt for NSC. 
For 10=Sn , according to the theory, chances for a cooperation equilibrium in ReC amount to 
4.7% . The actual cooperation rate averaged over the first five periods is 55.1% in ReC 
whereas 24.1% in NSC. Thus, in the beginning, in contrast to the theoretical predictions there 
is a considerable amount of cooperation in ReC. 
Figure 2.4, panel a) shows, dependent from the community size, the percentage of subjects 
who should reward others according to the theory (on the equilibrium path) and the actual 
percentage of reward providers in the experiment (here we count subjects who reward a 
fellow community member who contribute exactly the same amount or more). For large 
communities as frequently observed in the experiment, the theory predicts that a very small 
fraction of players would reward (below 5%). However, in the experiment, we actually 
observe that 40%-50% are reward providers. 
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Figure 2.4 Percentage of subjects in ReC who reward others with equal or more contributions 
Unlike PuC, the percentage of subjects who opt for ReC is high in the beginning and remains 
stable over the rounds. In the last period, on average, 10.5 subjects inhabit ReC while 1.5 
subjects are members of NSC. Thus the occupation of ReC is roughly the same as in the early 
phase. However, over the rounds, we observe a strong decline in contributions in ReC. In the 
last five periods, the cooperation rate in ReC amounts to 35.3% while it is 8.6% in NSC. 
Figure 2.4, panel b) shows that the decline in contributions is accompanied by a strong 
decrease of the percentage of reward providers. While in the first five periods 78.5% of 
subjects are reward providers in the last five periods only 30.3% reward. As Figure 2.4, panel 
a) shows, the variation of the cost parameter for rewarding has virtually no effect on the 
percentage of reward providers. 
For 10=Sn , the theory predicts that the probability for the existence of the equilibrium h) is 
virtually zero. Thus, in REW (as in case of PUN), in the long run the theory and the 
experimental findings diverge. In REW, as in PUN, variations of c and jα  does not 
significantly change the probabilities for the community choice equilibrium h). 
Summary of the comparison of the theory with the observed community choice 
To sum up, in PUN as well as in REW, in the long run the experimental findings are different 
from the theoretical predictions. In both treatments, “adjusting” the parameters of the model 
does also not help to bridge the gap between the predictions of the theory and the observed 
behavior in our experiment. In the following, we deepen the analysis of subjects’ behavior by 
investigating the immediate changes in contributions and sanctioning after a community 
change. 
2.5.5. Community changes and immediate change in contributions  
In PuC, in the early phase of the experiment, a “culture of cooperation” is established by 
enforcers who harshly punish free-riders. Already in the first period, the vast majority 
(87.5%), of the high contributors in PuC exert punishment tokens to discipline low 
contributors. These subjects amount to 14.6% of the total population. The punishment of 
defectors is likely to serve two purposes: it either encourages the defectors to increase their 
contributions or it convinces them to leave PuC. Subjects receive the more punishment tokens 
 50
the more they deviate from the respective community average.28 Thus on average, any attempt 
to free ride is not tolerated by the other community members. In subsequent periods, a 
majority of the incoming subjects to PuC adapt this “culture”, i.e., they not only contribute 
high but also participate in the second order public good and punish free-riders. 
Figure 2 panel a) illustrates the cumulative distribution of the changes in contributions 
immediately after a subject has moved to the other community in PUN.29 In total 76.3% of 
subjects increase their contribution after switching from NSC to PuC. 46.4% of the subjects 
contribute very low ( 5≤g ) in NSC before switching; but the same subjects contribute very 
high ( 15≥g ) after the change in PuC. Moreover, 17.9% even “convert” from a complete 
free-rider to a full cooperator; increasing their contributions from 0 to 20 after the change to 
PuC. In 46.7% of these cases, subjects punish other subjects who contributed less than they 
themselves immediately after change. Thus, the former free-riders not only adapt their 
contributions but they also engage in costly punishment of subjects whose payoff from Stage 
1 is higher than the own payoff, i.e., they indeed reduce the inequality in payoffs between 
themselves and others in the FS sense. The change in contributions after switching in the 
opposite direction, i.e., from PuC to NSC, is similarly extreme: 66.8% of subjects decrease 
their contribution after the change to NSC. 15.3% switch even from full cooperation to 
complete free-riding.30 
The predominant tendency to punish free-riders after a migration from NSC to PuC nicely 
demonstrates that subjects adapt to the common behavior in PuC. This “conformist” tendency 
sustains punishment activities on a considerable level such that cooperation can be stabilized. 
As the size of PuC grows, there exist always a sufficient number of subjects who are ready to 
punish the free-riders.31 
In REW, a change between communities barely has an effect on subjects’ contributions (see 
Figure 2 panel b). After switching to ReC, only 39.2% of subjects increase their contributions 
at all. When the change is directed from ReC to NSC, roughly one third of the subjects 
increase their contributions while one third decrease their contributions after the change. 
Another third do not change their investments at all. 
                                                 
28 All Spearman-rank-correlation-coefficients computed for each independent observation are positive. A 
binomial test with these correlation coefficients rejects that a negative correlation is as likely as a positive 
correlation (p = 0.016). Below average contributors are punished with 10.4 tokens. Moreover, the subjects who 
contribute less than 15 tokens compared to the community average are punished with more than 30 punishment 
tokens on average, i.e., they have to suffer from an income reduction of more than 90 tokens. This means that 
they incur a true loss in that round since the saved contribution of 20 token is by far out weighted by the received 
punishment. However, above average contributors also receive 0.7 tokens, on average. For the frequently 
observed punishment of high contributors in experiments see e.g. Cinyabuguma et al. (2006). 
29 We calculate the difference between the subject’s contribution in round t and the contribution of that subject in 
round t -1 conditional upon the subject changed the community from round t -1 to round t. 
30 This observation is well in line with the experimental findings by Falk et al. (2003). They show that the 
contribution behavior of subjects is influenced by social interactions with their “neighbors”. Subjects who 
simultaneously belong to two different groups with disjoint group compositions exhibit conditionally 
cooperative behavior, i.e. the same subject contributes more if she is in a community with high contributors and 
contributes less if she is in a community with low contributors. 
31 The burden of punishing is shared: 92 out of 95 subjects who inhabit PuC faced at least one time a situation in 
which a community member contributed less than themselves. In such a situation, 81.5% of them punished at 
least one time a low contributor, 69.6% punished more than once in such a situation. More than half of the 
subjects (55.4%) even punished 5 or more times. 
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Figure 2.5 Cumulative distribution of contribution differences after the community change 
The way how altruistic rewarding might enhance cooperation is different. While punishment 
is mainly addressed to free-riders who act in their own but not in the groups’ interest, 
rewarding is directed to group members who already act to the best of the group. In 66.1% of 
all cases, high contributors reward other high contributors. The vast majority of rewards are 
directed to subjects who contribute equal or more than the reward provider (in 58.1% and 
30.2% of all cases, respectively). If low contributors are rewarded at all, they receive very 
small amounts. Below average contributors receive 0.7 tokens whereas above average 
contributors receive 6.1 tokens. Below average contributors send on average 1.8 reward 
tokens to other community members whereas above average contributors send 5.0 tokens. 
Hence, rewarding is mainly an efficiency enhancing exchange of transfers within the group of 
cooperative subjects. This fact constitutes a fundamental difference between the use of 
punishment and rewards. While punishment is addressed to norm violators in order to 
“encourage” them to cooperate, rewarding is addressed to the subjects who already cooperate. 
Non-cooperators may only be indirectly convinced to cooperate by experiencing and/or 
observing that cooperators receive additional rewards. This indirect mechanism does not seem 
to be as effective as the direct mechanism of punishment. In fact, interval regressions (see 
Table 2.12) with observations as clusters show that punished subjects increase their 
contributions in the following period whereas rewarded subjects decrease them. 
Table 2.12: Contribution difference of the teammate between t–1 and t 
Coefficient PuC ReC 
Period -0.009 (0.006) -0.126*** (0.026) 
Received tokens in t-1 0.339*** (0.064) -0.393** (0.171) 
Constant 0.104 (0.125) 3.489*** (0.834) 
***, **, and * denote significance level 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for 8 clusters in PuC and for 6 clusters in ReC). 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this study we theoretically and experimentally investigate the community choice in a social 
dilemma setting. Our theoretical considerations predict that equilibria with positive 
contributions occur under very restrictive conditions. In particular, cooperation in large 
communities is virtually never possible given the commonly accepted distributions of 
inequality parameters in the population. The reason is that in general, to sustain cooperation in 
large communities, a great fraction of subjects must have high inequality parameters. Our 
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experimental findings, however, show a different picture. In PUN – where subjects are given 
the choice between a non-sanctioning community (NSC) and a community with punishment 
possibilities (PuC) – initially, most subjects choose NSC, but over time PuC becomes selected 
with an increasing frequency. In the final rounds almost all subjects join PuC. Despite severe 
punishment in the beginning, PuC leads to high efficiency levels with full contribution of all 
participants and no punishment in the end. In REW, where the choice is between NSC and a 
community with rewarding possibilities (ReC), we do not observe a comparable effect. 
Despite subjects’ strong initial preference for ReC and a relatively high level of cooperation – 
maintained by a frequent rewarding activity – over time subjects’ willingness to reward 
deteriorates. This is surprising since rewarding is efficiency enhancing. We observe that on 
average exchanging rewards does not lead to an increase in contributions but it rather 
activates a spiral downwards which leads over time to a considerable decrease of cooperation. 
Models of cultural group selection indeed show that sanctioning defectors can result in stable 
cooperation when strategies for cooperation and punishment can spread among individuals 
through social learning (see e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1992 or Henrich and Boyd 2001). If the 
norm to cooperate and punish defectors is sufficiently manifested in the group culture and 
punishment is sufficiently costly for the punished subject, rare non-cooperators are less 
successful than cooperators because they experience severe punishment. A tendency to 
imitate successful behavior (payoff-biased transmission) enhances the propensity of 
cooperative behavior. Punishment behavior is stabilized by the tendency to imitate the 
common behavior (conformist transmission). In the latter case group members punish, 
because it is common to do so, although cooperators who do not punish defectors have a 
payoff advantage compared to those who both cooperate and punish. However, when 
cooperation in a group is sufficiently widespread, this payoff-advantage is relatively small 
and only a weak tendency of conformist behavior suffices to oppose the payoff-biased 
transmission (in small disfavor of punishers) and stabilize the punishment of non-cooperators. 
Cooperation and punishment, however, does not constitute the only equilibrium in cultural 
group selection; non-cooperation and non-punishment can also be sustained as an equilibrium. 
Our experimental findings from the PUN treatment seem to support the intuition provided by 
the payoff-biased and conformist transmission. Cooperative groups start with few members 
and are then invaded by free-riders who are attracted by high payoffs. Once being a member 
of PuC, subjects seem to change their types – although they used to refrain from contributing 
in NSC, once being in PuC they convert to a cooperator and even into a punisher. Since more 
and more subjects share the burden of punishment, the payoff disadvantage of punishers 
diminishes. The consequence is that we observe almost full cooperation in a highly occupied 
punishment community. 
With this study we provide a further step towards the understanding of community choice in 
social dilemmas. Our results provide evidence that punishment mechanism “outcompetes” the 
non-sanctioning mechanism when both can be selected. In an indirect way of comparison, 
punishment is also more successful than a community which relies on voluntary bilateral 
rewarding because it leads to a very high level of cooperation. The latter does better if it can 
be selected against a non-sanctioning mechanism, however by far not as good as the 
punishment mechanism. This result expands previous findings on the superior performance of 
punishment mechanisms when they are exogenously “imposed”. 
Our results raise several promising questions for future research. How sensitive are our 
findings regarding the switching costs between communities? How important is the role 
amount of information about the other community? Or, what happens if individuals cannot 
choose between communities, but instead can create new alternative institutions or adapt the 
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existing institutional framework? How can the initial losses in PuC be mitigated? 
Contributions in these directions can help us understand how institutions emerge, work, and 
how they influence the human behavior and pave the way for designing effective institutions 
that reduce the downside effects inherent to social dilemmas. 
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3. Social history and the community choice in social 
dilemmas 
3.1. Introduction 
For communities with an exogenously fixed composition of members, experimental studies 
identify peer punishment as valuable means to sustain cooperation in social dilemma 
situations (Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom et al. 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Recent studies by 
Gürerk et al. 2006 and 2007 show that communities with punishment possibilities even 
prevail in societies with competing communities applying different institutional rules. In their 
experimental setup, subjects repeatedly choose between communities with and without 
punishment possibilities before interacting in a social dilemma situation. In the beginning, the 
great majority of individuals prefer the non-punishment community (NPC). However, over 
time the situation changes dramatically. Since cooperators who also bear costs to punish free-
riders cause cooperation to rise in the punishment community (PuC), more and more 
individuals leave NPC and join PuC. Towards the end of the experiment, more than 90% of 
subjects inhabit PuC. Even though the community becomes very large, the cooperation rate 
remains surprisingly stable and converges to almost 100%. This finding clearly demonstrates 
the competitive advantage of peer punishment communities. However, cooperation 
enforcement through punishment is costly and lowers efficiency in the short run. The question 
arises how this problem can be mitigated. 
There are several possible explanations for subjects’ initial reluctance to join the punishment 
community. Subjects may have a “natural aversion” against receiving punishment since they 
associate negative feelings with it. Social psychologists define negative sanctions as 
deliberate acts that lead to unpleasant inner states that the punished person wants to avoid. 
Additionally, subjects may fear to be exposed to “perverse” punishment, i.e., punishment of 
high contributors. In fact, this is a frequently observed phenomenon in experimental studies 
(see e.g. Cinyabuguma et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, subjects may anticipate that there will be a lot of punishment in PuC, 
especially in the beginning of the interaction. For this reason, they may “rationally” decide to 
wait and see how the situation in PuC develops before joining in. There is no reason to wait 
anymore when the payoffs in PuC outperform the payoffs in NPC. From that point it is more 
profitable to join PuC than to remain in NPC. Yet another explanation for the initial 
reluctance could be that subjects simply do not anticipate correctly that PuC is the more 
efficient community in the long run. Previous studies show that the provision of a social 
history about the results of an experiment may in some situations influence the behaviour of 
the informed subjects who are going to play the same game (Berg et al. 1995), whereas it does 
not influence the results in others (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003). 
In this study, we investigate whether the lack of information on the high cooperation levels in 
PuC is a critical force that drives the reluctance to join PuC. Our conjecture is that social 
history, i.e., experience-based information, will lower people’s reluctance towards PuC by 
correcting the possible “false anticipation” about its performance. In order to test this we 
conduct a social history treatment (SH) which is the exact replication of the PUN treatment 
from the study Gürerk et al. 2007. The only difference is that in SH a social history – which 
contains the main results of the PUN – is provided to the subjects. 
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3.2. The Basic Model and the Experimental Design 
The experiment is based on a public goods game of 30 repetitions including three stages in 
each period: In Stage 1 (institution choice stage) N  participants in each group choose 
(without a cost) between a non-punishment community (NPC) and a community with a peer 
punishment mechanism (PuC). In Stage 2 (contribution stage) members of each community 
are endowed with 20 experimental tokens and can anonymously invest g ( 200 ≤≤ g ) in the 
public good. The defining characteristic of a public good is fulfilled independently from the 
number of members θn  with }2,1{∈θ  in each community because the marginal per capita 
return a  is 1/1 << ani
θ  for all θin  with Nni ≤≤
θ2 . In PuC, Stage 2 is followed by Stage 3 
(punishment stage). Here, all subjects are endowed with 20 additional tokens and may 
anonymously assign punishment tokens to each other (subjects in NPC also receive additional 
20 tokens and simply keep these). Each received punishment token lowers the payoff of the 
punished subject by three tokens. After each period, all participants receive feedback about 
contributions, received punishment tokens and payoffs in both communities. For a money 
maximizing subject with self-centered preferences it is always the dominant strategy to refrain 
from contribution as well as not to punish. 
The social history is handed out to subjects before the experiment starts. For both 
communities it separately tabulates the averages of the number of community members, 
contributions, received punishment tokens in PuC, and the payoffs of the baseline treatment 
(PUN) for each period. Additionally, the developments of the averages are visualized in small 
figures. In the instructions we use a neutral framing by labeling the communities A and B and 
we refrain from using the word punishment. 72 students from University of Erfurt participated 
in three experimental sessions. A session lasted on average 2 hours including instructions. 
Average earnings were 24 Euros. 
3.3. Results 
Already in the first period the social history has significant effects on subjects’ community 
choices and contributions. The majority (54.2%) of the participants in SH prefer PuC to NSC 
in the first period. This is in sharp contrast to the baseline treatment PUN where only less than 
one third (31.2%) of the subjects opt for PuC (p = 0.037)32. Thus, social history lowers the 
initial reluctance against PuC significantly. Moreover, subjects in PuC of SH cooperate on a 
higher level than subjects in PuC of PUN in the first period. In particular, the fraction of high 
contributions ( 15≥g ) is significantly larger in SH (74.4%) than in PUN (53.3%) (p = 0.057). 
On the other hand, in SH only 5.1% of the subjects who join PuC initially are free-riders 
( 5≤g ) whereas in PUN this is true for one third of the subjects. Thus, when subjects are 
provided with a social history, PuC attracts cooperators while it deters free-riders. In total, 
this results in a very high cooperation level of 78.5% in PuC. 
Let us now take a closer look at the initial punishment behavior. Does the social history lead 
to less punishment (because of the high cooperation level that is achieved immediately) or 
does it lead even to more punishment (because the social history encourages the members of 
PuC to punish)? Indeed, the frequency of peer-to-peer punishment is slightly higher in SH 
(2.1 instances per subject) than in PUN (1.4) in the first period. However, the severity of 
punishment, i.e., average tokens sent per punishment instance, is lower in SH (2.3 tokens) 
than in PUN (3.4) (p = 0.131). Hence the amount of tokens spent for punishment per member 
is roughly the same in both treatments (5.1 in SH, 5.4 in PUN). 
                                                 
32 All reported non-parametric statistical tests are two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests and use the session averages 
as independent observations. 
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In both treatments, the average payoff in PuC (29.2) is significantly lower than in NPC (44.9) 
(p = 0.031) in the first period. Although this payoff difference between PuC and NPC is less 
pronounced in SH, subjects in both treatments suffer from a considerable efficiency loss due 
to punishment. However, in SH, average earnings in PuC rapidly catch up the payoffs in 
NPC. Already in the period 5, members of PuC earn on average more than members of NPC 
(see Figure 3.1d). Moreover, in SH, from period five onwards the average payoffs in NPC are 
constantly lower than in PuC. In contrast, in PUN, the average payoffs in PuC oscillate 
strongly in the beginning. They catch up with the payoffs in NPC in period 11 (see Figure 
3.1c). The average period where the earnings in PuC exceed the earnings in NPC is 7.2 in SH, 
while it is 15.1 in PUN (p = 0.037). This relation between earnings continues for the rest of 
the experiment. Hence, PuC becomes the more profitable community much earlier in SH than 
in PUN. Since PuC becomes the more profitable community, more and more subjects migrate 
from NPC to PuC in both treatments (see Figure 3.1b). 
With exception of one group in each treatment, there is at least one period in which all group 
members join PuC. However, such a period is observed much earlier in SH (on average in 
period 9.6) than in PUN (17.6) (p = 0.033). Moreover, the average number of consecutive 
periods where all members of a group inhabit PuC amounts to 15.4 periods in SH but only to 
5.6 periods in PUN (p = 0.027). In the last period, only one single subject in SH is not a 
member of PuC whereas in PUN roughly 10% of subjects still inhabit NPC. 
 
Figure 3.1 Average numbers 
If we look at total averages, punishment in SH is less severe than in PUN. A punished person 
receives less tokens in SH (5.2) than in PUN (6.8). Moreover, the severity of a punishment 
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instance is significantly lower in SH (2.4 tokens) than in PUN (3.1) (p = 0.043). In both 
treatments, subjects who contribute more frequently punish subjects who contribute less. In 
SH, this is true for 38.5% of relative instances while it is only true in 25.5% in PUN (p = 
0.101). Interestingly, in SH subjects with very high contributions are punished. On average a 
subject who receive punishment tokens contributes more in SH than in PUN (p = 0.064). The 
frequency of “perverse” punishment, i.e., the cases when the punished person contributed 
equally or more than the punisher is roughly the same in both treatments (SH: 1.7%, PUN: 
1.8%). However, the average severity of the unjustified punishment instances is significantly 


















Figure 3.2 Overall payoffs 
 
From the social planner’s perspective, one of the most interesting issues concerns the 
efficiency in the “society” as a whole including all its communities. Figure 3.2 shows the 
evolution of groups’ overall earnings in both treatments. In SH, the average payoff amounts to 
47.1 tokens while it is 44.5 in PUN. The surplus ratio, i.e., the actual surplus generated by 
cooperative behavior in the experiment divided by the maximum possible surplus amounts to 
59.2% in SH and 37.5% in PUN. Thus, the gains from cooperation are clearly higher in SH 
than in PUN (p = 0.101). 
3.4. Conclusions 
In this study, we explore whether informed subjects are less reluctant to join a community 
with a peer punishment mechanism in a social dilemma situation than uninformed subjects. 
We find that significantly more informed subjects join the punishment community initially 
and start to cooperate on a much higher level than the uninformed. With social history, the 
punishment is more directed at low contributors and is not as severe as in the baseline 
treatment. This results in higher payoffs. In the long run, with social history, punishment 
community attracts even more members of the society compared to when social history is not 
provided. As a consequence, the societies reach a higher overall efficiency. Our findings shed 
light on the importance of experience-based information for the acceptance of seemingly 
unpopular but socially desirable mechanisms. 
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4. Motivating Teammates: The Leader’s Choice of 
Positive and Negative Incentives33 
 
“The […] most obvious way to bring about 
cooperation between employees […] is to pay for 
cooperation or to punish uncooperative behavior.” 
Edward P. Lazear34 
4.1. Introduction 
In his classic study of leadership behavior Burns (1978) combines insights from the literature 
on traits, leadership styles and leader-member exchange research and coins the distinction 
between transactional and transformational leadership styles. In Burn’s view these two styles 
constitute different poles of leadership style dimensions. A transformational leader is one who 
offers a purpose that transcends short-term goals and focuses on higher order intrinsic needs. 
Exhibiting transactional leadership, in contrast, means that followers agree with, accept and 
comply with the leader in exchange for praise, rewards and resources or the avoidance of 
disciplinary action. Building on these two notions Bass (1985) argues that transformational 
and transactional leadership are separate concepts and suggests that “the best leaders are both 
transformational and transactional” (Bass 1999, p. 21). Aviolo (1999) even suggests that 
“transactions are the base for transformations” (p. 37). Recent meta-studies on leadership 
styles seem to support this complimentary view that without the foundation of transactional 
leadership, transformational effects may not be possible (see for example, Lowe et al. 1996, 
Judge and Piccolo 2004, Bono and Judge 2004). In this study we will have a closer look at the 
two main tools available for transactional leadership: rewards and punishment. We will focus 
on the leader’s choice problem as well on the effect on followers. In a literature review 
Podsakoff (1982) concludes that “research on the variables affecting a supervisor’s use of 
rewards and punishment is still in its infancy” (p. 76). With few recent studies on this topic as 
notable exceptions his statement still appears to be valid. An important issue which needs 
further investigation in this respect is the conventional wisdom that leaders are very powerful 
in influencing the culture in a team or organization. The most prominent proponent of this 
view is Schein (2004) who argues that “I believe that cultures begin with leaders who impose 
their own values and assumptions on a group” (p. 2).35 So far, the impact of the cultural 
variations induced by punishment and rewards combined with the respective incentive effects 
on success is still an open question. To shed light on this issue we investigate how a team 
leader chooses between positive and negative sanctions and how his choice influences the 
performance of teammates. Since these two questions can only be answered on an empirical 
basis we opt for an experimental approach, which has the decisive advantage that one can 
control for all situational variables and unambiguously observe the chosen actions. 
In our simple model, the leader is a primus inter pares, i.e. he contributes to the team’s 
production as the other team members do but he is the one who decides on the incentive 
                                                 
33 This chapter is based on the working paper “Motivating Teammates: The Leader’s Choice of Positive and 
Negative Incentives”, joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch and Bettina Rockenbach. All authors contributed 
equally. 
34  Personnel Economics for Managers, 1998, pp. 269-270 
35  Schein (2004) defines culture of a group as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group 
as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems” (p. 17). 
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culture and the actual application of the specified sanctions.36 The production process of the 
team is modeled such that from the perspective of an individual member it is beneficial to 
free-ride although from the viewpoint of the team as a whole everybody should contribute as 
much as he can. To overcome this dilemma situation the leader can apply sanctions. We 
assume that the leader is able to perfectly monitor the members of the team and has the power 
to apply sanctions to the other team members. Which sanctioning scheme do team leaders 
prefer in such a situation? How does the leader’s choice influence the performance of the 
teammates? Do the prospects of receiving rewards motivate the teammates more than the 
threat of punishment? Which scheme induces more cooperation? Which is more profitable for 
the team, the leader, and the teammates?  
In recent studies it has been observed that punishment fosters cooperation when it is available 
in a situation that is prone to free-riding (see e.g. Yamagishi 1986, Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
Punishment may enhance cooperation even it is only symbolic (Masclet et al. 2003). 
However, punishment seems to have ambivalent effects on cooperation when it can 
deliberately be adopted by a party or peers before they interact with each other. While people 
seem to be reluctant to opt for negative sanctions (Sutter et al. 2006) and detrimental effects 
on cooperation in bilateral contracting have been observed (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003) there 
is also evidence that over time – after experiencing free-riding – punishment institutions 
becomes widely accepted and indeed improves cooperation level (Gürerk et al. 2007), 
negative sanctions can have. Dickinson and Isaac (1998) report that (exogenous) rewarding of 
both absolute and relative high contributions increase efforts towards a joint project. 
Contributions are highest when rewards are given for relative contributions, i.e., the 
contributions are evaluated with respect to the heterogeneous endowments (“abilities”) of 
each member. Dickinson (2001) shows that exogenous penalties (negative incentives) are 
more efficient than prizes (positive incentives) when the contributions of heterogeneously 
endowed team members are evaluated after their absolute contributions to the public good. 
Sefton et al. (forthcoming) report a similar result from a public goods game. They find that 
the contributions and the earnings are higher when both reward and punishment possibilities 
are present. Sutter (2006) reports that in a threshold public good game a tournament design 
induces higher efforts than equally high rewards. Potters et al. (2005a) find that the presence 
of a leader who has discretionary power to determine the shares from the team output 
improves the team performance compared to a situation in which the team output is split 
among the team members equally.  
The study by Sutter et al. (2006) is similar to ours with respect to the contribution mechanism 
and the endogenous choice of sanctions. In one of their treatment all players vote on a 
mechanism before interacting in a public goods setting (the alternatives include peer 
rewarding, peer punishment or simply no sanctioning). In our setting, only one single member 
– the leader of a team – chooses the incentive scheme. Second, in our setting, the leader is the 
only member of the team who has the possibility to reward or to punish while he himself is 
not subject to sanctions from none of the teammates. In our setting after a certain period of 
time the leader can change the institution, i.e., the available incentive scheme. Our study is 
also related to recent studies on leadership, in which the leader can give an example by 
choosing his contribution first which is then communicated to the followers before they 
decide on their contributions. It has been shown that in a setting with asymmetric information 
on the productivity of the team, followers mimic the informed leader’s actions when 
contributing to a public good (Potters et al., 2005b, Potters, 2007). But also in situations with 
                                                 
36  Alchian and Demsetz (1972) also suggest a team leader, who monitors the teammates, as a solution to the 
free-rider problem in teams. Their team leader, however, is the residual claimant, i.e., he is paid the residual of 
the team’s profit minus the compensation of the teammates. 
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symmetric information second movers often follow the leader. Moxnes and van der Heijden 
(2003) find that the contributions to a “public bad” are lower when there is a leader who 
decides first compared to the situation without a leader and simultaneous decisions. A similar 
finding is reported by Gächter and Renner (2004). In a public good setting followers invest 
the more the more the leader contributes. This correlation is also true in a one-shot 
experiment. However, in the repeated interactions the followers contribute systemically less 
than the leader. Thus, leaders also reduce their contributions over time, which brings down 
the team production over time. Güth et al. (2007) find that leading by example induces a 
marginal but significant increase in contributions in a public good setting. They also show 
that if a leader has the power to (temporarily) exclude a team member contributions increase.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces our experimental model and 
design. In section 3 we provide some thoughts on expected findings and section 4 reports the 
results. Section 5 concludes with some remarks on implications and suggestions for future 
research. 
4.2. Experimental Design 
We model team production in a voluntary contribution setting. A team consists of 6=N  
members. The role of the team leader is randomly assigned to one of the team members. The 
team leader’s role is identical to that of all other team members apart from his ability to 
choose an incentive scheme and his power to exert sanctions. The team leader chooses 
between a positive (POS) and a negative (NEG) incentive scheme, which will be applied to 
the next T = 10 periods.37 All other N-1 team members, whom in the following we will refer 
to as teammates, are informed about the leader’s decision regarding the incentive scheme. 
Each period consists of two stages. In stage 1 the team leader and the teammates decide 
simultaneously about the effort they want to contribute to their team’s project, i.e., we 
basically model the team project by a voluntary contribution mechanism with a constant 
marginal productivity R = 1.6. For simplicity the costs of effort are assumed to be the same 
for all agents and equal to 1 for each effort unit. Effort per agent is restricted to a maximum of 
y = 20, i.e., ci(ei) = ei with 0 ≤ ei ≤ y for i = 1, …, N. If q > 1 is the exogenously given prize for 
one unit of output the total profit of the team is given by qR(e1 + e2 + … + eN). Let 0 < φ < 1 
denote the share of the team’s profit that the firm gives to the team as wage. Note that we 
abstract from modeling the firm explicitly. If one assumes that the team members apply an 
equal sharing rule, each team member earns φqR(e1 + e2 + … + eN)/N. To keep things simple 
in the experiment we normalize φq to be equal to 1. Thus, the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) a in our setting amounts to a = (R/N) = (4/15) and satisfies the condition 
1/1 << aN , which means that it is individually rational not to contribute to the team’s output 
although it would be socially optimal to contribute maximal effort.38 In stage 2, dependent on 
the chosen incentive scheme, the leader has the possibility to individually assign positive or 
negative tokens to the teammates. For this purpose the leader exogenously receives 20 
additional tokens – one might think of an extra budget that is given from a higher 
management level to the team leader for the bonus payments. The leader can assign the 
additional tokens to the teammates or simply keep them as fringe benefits for the own 
account. Both positive and negative incentives have a leverage of 1:3, i.e., for each token 
invested by the leader, the payoff of the recipient is increased by 3 tokens in POS, or 
decreased by 3 tokens in NEG, respectively. At the end of each period, all team members 
                                                 
37  We keep the incentives schemes fixed for 10 periods to resemble the fact that corporate codes of conducts and 
corporate cultures cannot be changed every day but have to be stuck to for a certain period of time (see Schein 
2004). 
38  See Holmström (1982), for similar approaches to model team production in experiments see Nalbantian and 
Schotter (1997), Croson (2001), Sutter (2006) and Irlenbusch and Ruchala, forthcoming. 
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receive feedback about all individual contributions, payoffs and received tokens. The values 
for the leader and the teammates are indicated separately.  
Our experiment consisted of three phases with T = 10 periods each, i.e., the leader decided at 
three points in time on the incentive scheme that ruled the next 10 consecutive periods. The 
team composition was fixed for the duration of the whole experiment. In Figure 4.1 the 
sequence of the experiment is visualized. 




incentive scheme 1 incentive scheme 2










Stage 2: Leader can act according to chosen 
incentive scheme (positive or negative)  
Figure 4.1 The sequence of actions in the experiment 
 
60 students from the University of Erfurt were randomly allocated to 10 experimental teams 
of six subjects each, i.e., we have 10 independent observations. In the instructions we 
employed a neutral language. We labeled team leaders as type A players and the teammates as 
type B players. We did not speak of rewards or punishment. Instead, we used the terms 
positive and negative tokens that can be assigned by the type A player to type B players. A 
session lasted for approximately 90 minutes and average earnings were about 15 Euros. 
4.3. Which incentive scheme will a leader choose? 
A leader with self-centered preferences is only interested in maximizing his or her monetary 
payoff and should not engage in costly reward or punishment activities. Thus, in our setting 
the leader should be indifferent between both incentive schemes since with both incentive 
schemes he can keep the same amount of endowment. 
A leader with social preferences does not solely care for the own monetary payoff. For 
example, an inequity averse player as defined by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) cares also about 
the inequality between the own and other players’ payoff and both payoff inequalities – to the 
own advantage or to the own disadvantage – cause utility losses. Several researchers have 
already come up with theoretical explanations why teams, in which members exhibit social 
preferences, tend to behave more cooperatively (see e.g. Huck and Biel, forthcoming, Biel 
2004, Mohnen et al. 2007). Their explanations are related to the effect of peer pressure which 
has also been verified empirically (see e.g. Falk and Ichino 2003). If negative sanctions are 
available Fehr and Schmidt have shown that also a single player with preferences of inequity 
aversion is able to discipline a whole group of free-riders by a credible threat to punish. Thus, 
in NEG a leader with a sufficient distaste for disadvantageous inequality in payoffs is 
potentially able to “enforce” a positive contribution level. In general this is less likely with 
positive sanctions as in POS, in which a leader with a distaste for disadvantageous inequality 
is not unilaterally able to force the teammates to contribute (see Gürerk et al. 2007). Thus, a 
leader who dislikes disadvantageous inequality is more likely to opt for NEG as an incentive 
scheme. 
 66
A leader with efficiency preferences who is interested in maximizing the total utility of the 
team might be inclined to choose POS since in POS the leader has the possibility to 
unilaterally increase the efficiency by allocating rewards. The reason is that each reward 
token assigned by the leader to a teammate costs the leader one token but increases the 
teammate’s payoff by three tokens. Thus, by rewarding, the leader can increase the joint 
payoff of the team by two tokens. Several researchers have shown that efficiency is indeed an 
important driving force (see e.g. Charness and Rabin 2002, Huck et al. 2007 provide an 
illuminating approach by arguing that social norms inside the firm tend to develop into the 
direction to support efficiency). 
4.4. Results 
In this section we report our experimental findings. First we investigate the leaders’ incentive 
scheme choices. We continue by comparing the leaders’ and teammates’ contributions 
dependent on the incentives schemes. Finally, we analyze the impact of positive and negative 
incentives which leads us to efficiency considerations. All reported non-parametric statistical 
tests are based on the averages over independent observations. 
4.4.1. Leaders’ incentive scheme choice 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the leaders’ incentive scheme choices as well as the 
contributions and payoffs dependent on the player type. Overall, we observe five different 
realized sequences of choices. According to the choices in the first and the last phase of the 
experiment we can summarize these five different sequences in three patterns. Three leaders 
choose POS in the first and in the last phase. Six leaders choose also POS in the first phase 
while they choose NEG in the last phase. The remaining leader initially chooses NEG but opts 
for POS in the last two phases. 
Table 4.1: Leaders’ incentive scheme choices and average contributions 
 Incentive scheme choice Contributions Payoffs 
 Efficiency 
in percent 
  Phase  Phase Phase Phase Phase     
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3  1 2 3 
Leader’s 
ID    Leader Teammates Leader Teammates 
    
5, 8 POS POS POS 11.2 11.0 8.9 13.2 12.1 8.6 35.5 36.2 37.5 35.7 34.0 29.7  38.7 37.4 33.7
1, 3, 6 POS POS NEG 7.6 7.6 9.3 8.8 10.5 14.5 35.3 35.2 42.2 31.5 33.5 21.1  34.9 36.7 47.3
2, 4, 9 POS NEG NEG 11.9 14.4 14 8.9 14.5 14.8 36.0 45.6 45.1 30.4 26.7 26.0  34.0 57.4 56.1
10 POS NEG POS 9.2 15.5 7.5 6.2 6.6 7.9 32.5 36.4 36.0 29.9 25.7 30.1  33.0 52.9 33.8
7 NEG POS POS 5.8 2.6 1.8 4.3 8.1 3.7 39.7 44.7 40.8 21.9 25.9 23.4  47.8 31.6 28.6
Efficiencies are given as percentages from the maximal obtainable total payoff. 
 
In the initial phase, the overwhelming majority of team leaders (9 out of 10) opt for POS 
whereas only one leader prefers NEG. A binomial test rejects that the observed distribution of 
choices could come about by chance (p = 0.021, two-tailed). Hence, initially, leaders are 
clearly reluctant to adapt negative incentives for their teams. 
Result 1 Initially, the large majority of leaders (90%) prefers the positive incentive scheme. 
In phase 2, five leaders stick to POS whereas four leaders switch from POS to NEG. 
Interestingly, the only team leader who initially chooses NEG and switches to POS after the 
first phase. Thus, in phase 2, the majority of the leaders (60%) again opt for rewards. Why do 
some leaders change to NEG whereas others prefer to stick to POS? Three of the four leaders 
who change from POS to NEG contribute much more to the public good than their teammates 
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before the change (on average 64.9% more). On the other hand, three of the five leaders, who 
stick to POS in phase 2, contribute considerably less in phase 1 than their teammates (about 
27% less). Thus, leaders who switch in phase 2 from POS to NEG are likely to be motivated 
by the disappointingly low contributions of teammates compared to their own contribution. 
In the last phase of the experiment, three of the four leaders who choose NEG in phase 2 
remain in NEG. Only one leader (observation 10) switches from NEG in phase 2 to POS. 
Thus, leader 10 is the only one showing a back and forth behavior choosing initially POS, 
switching to NEG in phase 2 and finally turning back to POS in phase 3. Three of the five 
leaders who choose POS twice switch to NEG in phase 3. Hence, the majority of leaders 
(60%) opt for NEG in the last phase. 
Result 2 In the last phase of the experiment, the majority of leaders (60%) opt for the 
negative incentive scheme. 
4.4.2. Evolution of contributions 
Figure 4.2 shows the development of average team contributions in different phases under 
both incentive schemes.39 What is the reason for the higher contributions in NEG? Is it 
because teammates fear to be punished? Do average contributions by leaders – who 
themselves cannot be punished – differ from their teammates after a change from POS to 
NEG? Overall, 6 of 7 leaders who change from POS in phase t to NEG in phase t+1 also 
significantly increase their average contributions in phase t+1 (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.047). In 
the initial phase, teams under POS contribute more than the single group using NEG. 
However, already in phase 2, teams contribute higher in NEG than in POS. 
Result 3 Overall (average of phases 1-3), team contributions are higher under NEG than 
under POS (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.016). This is also true if one considers the contributions of 
leaders and teammates separately (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.040, both). 
Moreover, in none of the seven cases, where a team switches from POS to NEG, the relation 
changes between the contributions of the leader and the teammates. This means that, if a 
leader contributes on average more than his teammates before changing from POS to NEG 
(this is the case in 4 teams) the leader continues to contribute more after the change in NEG. 
Analogously, if a leader contributes on average less than the teammates before a change from 
POS to NEG (in the remaining 3 teams), the leader also contributes less after the change. 
Interestingly, in the two cases where leaders switch in the opposite direction, i.e., from NEG 
to POS, the relation between the leaders’ and the teammates’ contributions reverses after the 
change, i.e., in these cases, leaders contribute more than their teammates before the change, 
however, after the change teammates contribute more than their leaders. 
Result 4 A change from positive to negative incentives does not alter the relation between the 
leader’s and the teammates’ contributions. 
                                                 
39  For an overview of different contributions over periods in different teams see appendix Figure A4.1. Average 
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Figure 4.2 Team contributions dependent on the incentive scheme 
 
Does switching from POS to NEG have an immediate effect on contributions? To answer this 
question we compare the last period contributions in POS (periods 10 and 20, respectively) 
before the change with the first period contributions in NEG after the change (periods 11 and 
21, respectively). In total, seven teams change from POS to NEG. In each of these teams 
contributions rise in the first period after change from on average 8.8 to on average 12.8 
(Wilcoxon test, p = 0.016). Interestingly, both leaders and teammates increase their 
contributions immediately. On average, leaders’ contributions rise from 9.9 to 12.4 units 
whereas the increase in teammates’ contributions is even larger from 8.6 to 12.8 units (the 
latter is significant, Wilcoxon test, p = 0.016; the former turns out not to be significant which 
is mainly because two leaders are not able to increase their contributions since they already 
contribute 20 before the change; in fact only one leader contributes less after a change to 
NEG). 
The effect on contributions of choosing POS two times in a row is not so clear. In total we 
have seven teams in which a leader chooses POS again after having been in POS before. On 
average, teammates decrease their contributions immediately in the first period of the second 
POS stage (from 10.9 to 10.5 units). Leaders, however, increase their contributions slightly 
(from 6.5 to 6.8 units). Both differences are not statistically significant, however. 
A change from NEG to POS occurs only in two teams. In both cases teammates increase their 
contributions while one leader increases and the other decreases their contributions. Due to 
the small number of observations, we cannot say much on the effect of this type of change. 
The question arises whether the teammates follow the leader’s example in the sense that they 
adjust their contributions towards the contribution of the leader. Figure 4.3 a) and b) show the 
evolution of the contributions dependent on player type and incentive scheme. Frequency 
distributions are shown in 3c) and d). 
On average, there exists no significant difference between leaders’ and teammates’ 
contributions under both incentive schemes. This is somewhat surprising since the leader is 
the only team member who cannot be sanctioned and thus might be less motivated to 
contribute. Does the leader exert higher effort to give an example for the other team 
members? In our setting the contribution decisions are made by all team members 
simultaneously. Thus, it is not possible that the team members follow their leader already in 
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the same period. However, imitation of the leader by the teammates may take place with a 
time lag, i.e., teammates may adapt to the leader’s contribution from the previous period 
(which they are informed about after each period). To investigate whether such a following 
behavior occurs in our experiment we run an interval regression. We ask whether the 
difference between the leader’s and a teammate’s contribution in period t-1 influences the 
contribution of this teammate in period t. As can be seen in Table 4.2, under both incentive 
schemes, the leader’s contribution in the current period indeed has a positive impact on 
teammates’ contributions in the following period. The actual influence of the leader’s 
contribution in the previous round is smaller in NEG than in POS. However, the effect of the 
sanctioning mechanism is considerable higher in NEG than in POS. Actually, the effect of 
positive sanctions turns out to be negative. This is in line with findings from Gürerk et al. 
(2006). We will discuss possible interpretations below. 
 
Figure 4.3 Team contributions dependent on type & incentive scheme 
Table 4.2: Teammates’ contributions explained by differences between own and leader’s contributions 
Coefficient POS NEG 
Leader’s contribution (in t–1) – teammate’s contribution (in t–1) 0.34*** (0.07) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
Received tokens in (t–1) -0.29* (0.16) 
0.84*** 
(0.22) 
Constant 0.72** (0.31) 
-0.84*** 
(0.26) 
***, **, and * denote significance level 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for 19 clusters in POS and for 11 clusters in NEG). 
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4.4.3. Use of incentives 
When do team leaders actually use the available incentive mechanism? Figure 4.4a) shows the 
percentage of cases where a teammate receives positive or negative tokens from the leader 
depending on the difference between own teammate’s and leader’s contributions. The 
overwhelming majority of 88% of those teammates who outperform leaders’ contributions are 
rewarded. On average, they receive 3.4 tokens, i.e., their payoff is increased by 10.2 tokens. 
Leaders also appreciate teammates who contribute exactly the same amount as they 
themselves (66% of these teammates are rewarded). They receive 3.1 tokens on average (i.e. 
their payoff is increased by 9.3 tokens). Surprisingly, roughly 40% of teammates who 
contribute less than their team leaders are also rewarded which might be interpreted as an 
encouragement for exerting higher efforts in the future or just as a means to increase 
efficiency. On average they receive 1.8 tokens on average (see Figure 4.4b), i.e., their period 
payoff is increased by 5.4 tokens on average. Teammates who free-ride completely, i.e., who 
contribute less than 5, are not rewarded at all. Thus, the use of positive incentives increases 
monotonically with the contribution difference between a teammate and the leader. 
Result 5 The frequency and the extent of positive incentives increases with the contribution 
difference between the leader and the respective teammate. Teammates who contribute the 
same as the leader are also considerably rewarded. 
In nine of the ten independent observations the coefficients of a Spearman-rank-correlation 
between contribution differences and reward tokens are highly positive. Hence a binomial test 
with these correlation coefficients clearly rejects that a positive correlation is as likely as a 
negative correlation (p = 0.021). 
 
Figure 4.4 Frequency and extent of sanctions 
Now we turn to the use of negative incentives. Leaders punish free-riders frequently and 
harshly. Almost 80% of free-riders are punished. On average, free-riders receive 8.9 negative 
tokens, i.e., their period payoff is reduced by 26.7 tokens. In total, 54% of teammates who 
contribute less than the leader receive negative tokens. Teammates who contribute exactly the 
same as the leader are virtually never sanctioned (4%). Surprisingly, leaders assign negative 
tokens also to teammates who contribute more than they do themselves. In fact this is true in 
28% of the cases in which teammates contribute more than the leader. 
Result 6 The frequency and the extent of negative incentives decreases with the contribution 
difference between the leader and the other team members. Teammates who contribute 
exactly the same amount as the leader are virtually never sanctioned. 
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In each of the eight independent observations where negative incentives are chosen the 
coefficients of Spearman-rank-correlations between contribution differences and punishment 
tokens are highly negative. A binomial test with these correlation coefficients clearly rejects 
that a negative correlation is as likely as a positive correlation (p = 0.008). Table 4.3 provides 
Tobit regressions which explain the allocated sanctioning tokens by the contribution of the 
respective teammate and the difference between his contribution and that of the leader. 
Table 4.3: Leaders’ choice of sanctioning tokens explained by teammates’ contributions and contribution 
difference to the leader 
Coefficient POS NEG 
Teammate’s contribution in t 0.28*** (0.01) 
-0.31*** 
(0.05) 
Leader’s contribution in t – teammate’s contribution in t -0.04*** (0.01) 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
Constant -1.26*** (0.13) 
1.29** 
(0.61) 
***, and ** denote significance level 0.01, and 0.05 respectively. 
 
What is the effect of incentives on the contributions of teammates? The regression provided in 
Table 4.2 already indicates that negative sanctions have an unambiguously positive influence 
on contributions while the influence of positive sanctions seems in fact to be negative. This is 
confirmed by Figure 4.5 which shows the immediate average change in teammates’ 
contributions from period t to period t+1 after receiving positive or negative tokens in period 
t. On average, teammates react to negative incentives with an increase of contributions. The 
more negative tokens a teammate receives the higher is the increase in contributions. On the 
other hand, teammates who do not receive any negative tokens in period t, reduce on average 
their contributions in period t+1 roughly by one token. 
Positive incentives have a different effect on contributions. On average, teammates decrease 
their contributions when they receive rewards. Roughly speaking it is true that the more 
positive tokens are received the stronger is the decrease in contributions. Not rewarding a 
teammate has also an effect. Teammates who do not receive any positive tokens increase their 
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Figure 4.5 The effect of sanctions on the contribution change of teammates 
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4.4.4. Payoffs and Efficiency 
Overall, team payoffs are higher in POS than in NEG (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.008). Note that 
the positive tokens sent by the leaders are tripled and thereby positive sanctions increase 
overall efficiency. Nevertheless, the differences in payoffs between both schemes diminish in 
the last phase. In the very last period due to high contributions the payoffs in NEG are even 
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Figure 4.6 Team payoffs dependent on the incentive scheme 
 
In both schemes, leaders’ payoffs are significantly higher than teammates’ payoffs (see Figure 
4.7). This is true for POS (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.028) as well as for NEG (Wilcoxon test, p = 
0.008). However, the differences between the payoffs are less pronounced in POS. When 
comparing the payoffs of both types of players it turns out that teammates’ earnings are 
higher in POS than in NEG (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.040) whereas leaders earn more in NEG 
than in POS (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.110). 
 
Figure 4.7 Team payoffs dependent on type & incentive scheme 
Leaders in NEG obtain higher payoffs for two reasons. As can be seen in Figure 4.8, leader 
payoffs from both stages are higher in NEG than in POS. This means that the leaders’ returns 
from the team production are higher in NEG than in POS in essence because average 
contributions – by leaders and by teammates – are higher in NEG. Moreover, in stage 2 
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leaders spent less on negative incentives in NEG than they spent on the positive incentives in 
POS. Also teammates’ payoffs from the team production stage are higher in NEG than in 
POS. However, in stage 2 teammates in NEG experience a decrease in payoffs due to received 
negative tokens while their payoff increases in POS due to the received positive tokens. The 
net effect from both stages is that teammates earn less in NEG than in POS although 
contributions are higher in NEG. 
 
Figure 4.8 Composition of payoffs 
We measure efficiency as the relation between the possible maximum payoff a team can 
obtain and the payoff a team actually achieves in the experiment. As already argued above, in 
POS, it is socially optimal (= maximum joint payoff) if the leader allocates all reward tokens 
to the teammates since every token sent by the leader increases the team’s net payoff by two 
additional tokens. In NEG, however, it is socially optimal when the team leader refrains from 
assigning any tokens to the teammates since each token in total reduces the team payoff by 
four tokens. In NEG, teams obtain 76.0% of the maximum possible payoff whereas in POS 
teams only manage to obtain 75.8% of the maximum possible payoff. Thus, both incentive 
schemes do not differ significantly from each other in terms of efficiency achieved. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this study we report on an experiment designed to analyze the behavior of a team leader 
who can choose a leadership style which relies either more on punishment or more on rewards 
as an incentive mechanism. Both mechanisms are seen as essential ingredients for successful 
transactional leadership. The question is, however, how a predominant focus on one of these 
mechanism influences a team’s performance. The choice of the leader is known to the team 
members before they decide on their contributions and it is kept fixed for a certain period of 
time. We keep the incentive scheme fixed for some periods (before it can be altered again) to 
account for the facts that an established culture in a team or organization – which is largely 
shaped by the prevailing incentive mechanism – cannot be changed on a day by day basis. 
The induced culture might indeed influence the contribution behavior of organizational 
members. A constant threat of punishment might be perceived as discouraging by the 
subordinates while a constant need for reward might burden the leader.  
We find that the overwhelming majority of 90 percent of the leaders opt for the positive 
incentives in phase 1. This finding is in line with the observed reluctance regarding the 
punishment option observed in other studies (Botelho et al. 2007, Sutter et al. 2006). 
However, the initial preference for rewards changes during the experiment since in the last 
phase, 60 percent of the leaders choose the negative incentives. This reflects the findings 
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reported in Gürerk et al. (2006). Overall contributions are higher if the negative sanctions are 
employed than in presence of rewards. Interestingly, this is not only true for the teammates 
but also for the leader who cannot be punished. A change from positive incentives to negative 
ones results in an immediate increase in contributions, i.e., the anticipation of potential 
punishment has already a positive effect on contributions. However, if the leader contributed 
already more before the switch he also does so afterwards. The application of negative and 
positive sanctions can largely be explained by the absolute amount of the contribution of the 
respective teammate and the contribution difference between him and the leader. While 
negative sanctions have an unambiguously increasing effect on contributions this is not the 
case for rewards. We can only speculate why this is the case. One explanation could be that 
teammates perceive a reward as a signal that they actually contributed more than was 
expected by the leader and therefore slack off afterwards. It appears to be quite promising to 
investigate this puzzling observation in more detail in the future. Another observation which 
deserves further investigation is that some leaders punish even if the respective team member 
contributed more than the leader himself. This finding is in line with observations by 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) who report frequent punishment of high contributors in standard 
VCMs. Apparently some leaders are not satisfied with or simply do not agree with 
contributions that exceed their own contributions. Neither standard economic theory nor 
inequality aversion can explain such behavior since assigning negative tokens to high 
contributors is costly and does not reduce the inequality in payoffs. On the contrary, it 
enlarges the inequality to the disadvantage of the teammates. We also observe a “leading by 
example effect” reported already in previous studies, i.e., teammates seem to contribute more 
the more the leader contributes (compare Gächter and Renner 2004, Güth et al., 2007). 
Surprisingly, this effect seems to be larger in a culture with positive sanctions than with 
negative ones. Apparently teammates are more reluctant to follow the leader if he threatens to 
punish. To investigate this effect in more detail also needs further research.  
Of course, one has to be cautious with immediately transferring the findings from a lab 
experiment to the real situation of a team in an organization. However, we think that – in 
addition to the behavioral tendencies outlined above – the discovered trade-off between 
punishment and rewards is likely to be also relevant in real teams. On the one hand negative 
sanctions seem to be the more powerful tool to encourage team members to exert effort. On 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1.1. Materials and Methods 
84 undergraduate students from the University of Erfurt voluntarily participated in the 
experiments. Special care was exerted to recruit students from many different disciplines to 
increase the likelihood that the subjects had never met before. Each participant was allowed to 
take part in one session only. In total 7 experimental sessions each involving 12 subjects took 
place. These sessions constituted the independent observations for the non-parametric 
statistical analysis. Most of the sessions were run in pairs, i.e., 24 subjects were gathered in 
the lab. 
The game is repeated over 30 periods and participants are not restricted by choices performed 
in previous periods. Each period consists of three stages: An institution choice stage (S0), a 
voluntary contribution stage (S1), and a sanctioning stage (S2). In stage S0 the participants 
simultaneously and independently choose between a sanctioning institution (SI) and a 
sanction-free institution (SFI) in which neither positive sanctioning (rewards) nor negative 
sanctioning (punishment) is possible. In stage S1, each participant is informed about the 
number of participants in each institution and in case the institution is occupied by at least two 
participants a public goods game is played with all participants who have chosen the same 
institution in S0. If only one subject joins an institution the subject’s total endowment is 
automatically transferred to her/his private account. The public good’s game constitutes a 
prototypical social dilemma in which each player is endowed with 20 money units (MUs) and 
may contribute between 0 and 20 MUs to a project which benefits the entire group. Each MU 
contributed to the public good is deducted from the contributor’s private account and creates a 
benefit of 1.6 MUs for the entire group. This group benefit is equally distributed among the 
group members, i.e. if a group consists of n members each member profits by 1.6/n MUs from 
each 1 MU contributed (1.6/n is the marginal per capita return MPCR). If, for example, only 
one group member contributes the total endowment of 20 and the other n–1 group members 
contribute nothing, the public good amounts to 20·1.6 and the contributor’s profit is 20·1.6/n 
while each free-riders’ profit is 20+20·1.6/n. If, however, all n group members contribute an 
identical amount of x, with 0≤x≤20, the public good is n·x·1.6 and each member achieves a 
profit of 20–x+1.6·x = 20+0.6·x. Hence for an identical contribution x of all group members 
the net benefit of each group member is 0.6·x independent from the group size n. The MUs 
not contributed to the public good are transferred to the participant’s private account. Thus, 
the provider’s return from one additional MU is less than 1 but the group’s return exceeds 1. 
Since the cost of providing is higher than the individual return, it is always in the material 
self-interest of any subject to free-ride on the contributions of the others and to keep all MUs 
for the private account. If all participants follow their material self-interest, nobody 
contributes to the public good and each participant achieves a payoff of 20 MUs. Because the 
group’s return of each MU invested is greater than 1, it is in the collective interest that all 
group members contribute their entire endowment to the group project. These diametrically 
opposed individual and collective interests constitute the social dilemma in public good 
provision. After the players have simultaneously made their contribution decisions, they are 
informed about the contributions of each member in the own group. 
At the beginning of stage S2 each player receives additional 20 tokens independent of the 
affiliation choice in S0. In SFI these tokens are directly transferred to the player’s private 
account without any decisions required, i.e. sanctioning was not possible. In SI these tokens 
may be used to positively or negatively sanction other members of SI by assigning between 
zero and 20 tokens to other members. Each player is free to choose which of the other 
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members of SI she/he wants to positively and/or negatively sanction and to determine the 
amount of allocated sanctioning tokens to each of those players. She/he is free to allocate 
different numbers of sanctioning tokens to different individuals with the only restriction that 
the sum of allocated tokens is limited to at most 20. Tokens not used for sanctioning are 
transferred to the player’s private account. Each token employed as a negative sanction costs 
the punished member 3 MUs and the punishing member 1 MU. Each token employed as a 
positive sanction yields the receiving member 1 MU and costs the employing member 1 MU. 
The leverage in the negative sanctioning mechanism is motivated by the understanding that 
punishment is more costly for the punished individual than for the punisher. We assume that 
the leverage in positive sanctioning is smaller and does not create any efficiency gains. The 
efficiency loss of negative sanctioning as well as the efficiency neutrality of positive 
sanctioning excludes efficiency gains solely by applying these instruments. 
At the end of the period each participant receives detailed (but anonymous) information about 
each individual other participant from both institutions: the contribution, the sum of allocated 
positive sanctioning and negative sanctioning tokens to others, the sum of received positive 
sanctioning tokens from others, the sum of received negative sanctioning tokens from others, 
and the period profit. Players are neither informed about the identities of the other players nor 
are they able to track the identities over periods, because the order in which the players’ 
details are displayed is known to be randomized in each period. In particular players could not 
identify the other players who allocated sanctioning tokens to them. 
At the beginning of the experiment subjects received written instructions (see the section 
“Experimental instructions” below). At the end of the experiment subjects privately received 
their experimental earnings in cash. One experimental session typically lasted for 2.5 hours, 
and on average subjects earned 24 € per session. All experimental decisions were made on a 
computer screen using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). Each of the 24 
computers was located in a booth such that subjects could not see or communicate with each 
other. 
The Effect of the Group Size on the Marginal per Capita Return (MPCR) 
The marginal per capita return (MPCR) denotes the individual return a recipient obtains from 
each token contributed. In a public goods game of n players the MPCR is lower than 1 and 
exceeds 1/n. The MPCR being lower than 1 implies that it is individually rational to refrain 
from contributing since the individual return is lower than the investment. The fact that the 
MPCR exceeds 1/n implies that contributing is collectively rational because the groups’ return 
on each token invested is greater than one. The endogenous group choice in each period of 
our experiment allows varying group sizes in each period. We constructed the MPCR such 
that it changes with the group size n, i.e. MPCR = 1.6/n. Hence, smaller groups have a higher 
MPCR than larger groups. Thus, the more members choose an institution the lower is the 
individual return on investment for one contributed token. As a consequence, however, the 
total “productivity” n·MPCR from the perspective of the group is constant, i.e. equal to 1.6. 
This means that all groups consisting of full cooperators achieve the same individual payoffs 
(i.e. 20·1.6), no matter how large the groups are. Hence, in the Nash-equilibrium of complete 
free-riding as well as under full cooperation the individual payoffs do not depend on the 
group size. From what is known on the interplay of the group size and the MPCR (Isaac et al, 
1984) our design favors cooperation in small groups and disfavors cooperation in large 
groups. 
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Figure A1.1 Subjects’ choices of institutions and their switching behavior in both directions 
Figure A1.1 displays the percentage of subjects who remain in the institutions or switch 
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Figure A1.2 Subjects’ average payoffs dependent on their contribution behavior 
 
Table A1.1: Logit analysis of the punishment probability dependent on the experience in SI (using individual 
dummies for subjects, 778 observations in total) 
 Coefficient Z value 
Number of periods in SI when punishing -.074 (.026) - 2.82*** 
Constant .798 (.278) 2.87*** 
*** denotes significance at 1%. The values in parentheses denote the standard errors. 
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Appendix 1.3. Instructions to the experiment 
General Information: At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to 
one of 2 subpopulations each consisting of 12 participants. During the whole experiment 
you will interact only with the members of your subpopulation. At the beginning of the 
experiment, 1,000 experimental tokens will be assigned to the experimental account of each 
participant. 
Course of Action: The experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages. In 
Stage 1, the group choice and the decision regarding the contribution to the project take place. 
In Stage 2, participants may influence the earnings of the other group members. 
Stage 1 
(i) The Group Choice: In Stage 1, each participant decides which group she wants to join. 
There are two different groups that can be joined: 
  Influence on the earnings of other group members 
A: No 
Group 
B: Yes, by assigning positive and negative tokens 
 
(ii) Contribution to the Project: In stage 1 of each round, each group member is endowed 
with 20 tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute to 
the project. The remaining tokens will be kept in your private account. 
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1: Your payoff in stage 1 consists of two components: 
• tokens you have kept = endowment – your contribution to the project 
• earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 1 amounts to: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of group 
members 
 
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group 
member. Please note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e. 
each group member benefits from all contributions to the project. 
Stage 2 
Assignment of Tokens: In stage 2 it will be displayed how many tokens each group member 
contributed to the project. (Please note: In each round the order of displaying the 
members’ actions will randomly be determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify any 
group member by her position on the displayed list throughout different rounds.) By the 
assignment of tokens in stage 2 you can increase or reduce the payoff of a group member or 
keep it unchanged. 
In each round each participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2. You have to decide 
how many of these 20 tokens you are going to assign to other group members. The remaining 
tokens are kept in your private account. You can check the costs of your token assignment by 
pressing the button “Calculation of Tokens”. 
• Each positive token that you assign to a group member increases her payoff by 1 token. 
• Each negative token that you assign to a group member reduces her payoff by 3 tokens. 
• If you assign 0 tokens to a group member her payoff won’t change.  
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Calculation of your payoff in stage 2: Your payoff in stage 2 consists of three components: 
• tokens you kept in your private account = 20 – sum of the tokens that you have 
assigned to the other group members 
• increased by the number of positive tokens you have received from other group 
members 
• diminished by the threefold number of negative tokens you have received from other 
group members 
 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 2 amounts to:  
20 – sum of the tokens that you assigned to other group members 
     + the number of positive tokens you received from other group members 
     – 3x (the number of negative tokens you received from other group members) 
 
Calculation of your round payoff: Your round payoff is composed of 
 Your payoff 
from Stage 1 
20 – your contribution to the project + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of  
        all group members / number of group members 
+ Your payoff from Stage 2 
20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to other group members   
     + number of positive tokens you have received from other members 
     – 3 x (the number of tokens you have received from other members)
= Your round payoff 
Special case: a single group member: If it happens that you are the only member in your 
group you receive 20 tokens in Stage 1 and 20 tokens in Stage 2, i.e. your round payoff sums 
up to 40. You do not have to take any action neither on Stage 1 nor on Stage 2. 
Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you receive a detailed 
overview of the results obtained in all groups. For every group member you are informed 
about her: Contribution to the project, payoff from the Stage 1, assigned tokens (if possible), 
received positive tokens (if possible), received negative tokens (if possible), payoff from 
Stage 2, round payoff. 
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round you receive an 
overview of the average results (as above) of all previous rounds. 
Total Payoff: The total payoff from the experiment is composed of the initial endowment of 
1,000 tokens plus the sum of round payoffs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment 
your total payoff will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 € per 100 tokens. 
Please notice: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. no 
other participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The 
payment is anonymous too, i.e. no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
We wish you success! 
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Appendix 2.1. Instructions to the experiment PUN Treatment 
General Information: At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to 
one of 2 subpopulations each consisting of 12 participants. During the whole experiment 
you will interact only with the members of your subpopulation. At the beginning of the 
experiment, 1000 experimental tokens will be assigned to the experimental account of each 
participant. 
Course of Action: The experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages. In 
Stage 1, the group choice and the decision regarding the contribution to the project take place. 
In Stage 2, participants may influence the earnings of the other group members. 
Stage 1 
(i) The Group Choice: In Stage 1, each participant decides which group she wants to join. 
There are two different groups that can be joined: 
 Influence on the earnings of other group members
A: No 
Group 
B: Yes, by assigning negative points 
(ii) Contributing to the Project: In stage 1 of each round, each group member is endowed 
with 20 tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute to 
the project. The remaining tokens will be kept by you. 
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1: Your payoff in stage 1 consists of two components: 
• tokens you have kept = endowment – your contribution to the project 
• earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 1 amounts to: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.6x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of group members 
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group 
member. Please note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e. 
each group member benefits from all contributions to the project. 
Stage 2 - Assignment of Tokens: In stage 2 it will be displayed how much each group 
member contributed to the project. (Please note: Before each round a display order will 
randomly be determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify any group member by her 
position on the displayed list throughout different rounds.) By the assignment of tokens you 
can reduce the payoff of a group member or keep it unchanged. 
In each round each participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2. You have to decide 
how many from the 20 tokens you are going to assign to other group members. The remaining 
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tokens are kept by yourself. You can check the costs of your token assignment by pressing the 
button Calculation of Tokens. 
• Each negative token that you assign to a group member reduces her payoff by 3 
tokens. 
• If you assign 0 tokens to a group member her payoff won’t change.  
Calculation of your payoff in stage 2: Your payoff in stage 2 consists of two components: 
• tokens you kept = 20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to the other group 
members 
• less the threefold number of negative tokens you have received from other group 
members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 2 amounts to:  
20 – sum of the tokens that you assigned to other group members 
     – 3x (the number of tokens you received from other group members) 
Calculation of your round payoff: Your round payoff is composed of 
 Your payoff 
from Stage 1 
20 – your contribution to the project + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of 
all group members / number of group members 
+ Your payoff 
from Stage 2 
20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to other group members 
       – 3 x (the number of tokens you have received from other group 
members 
= Your round payoff 
Special case: a single group member: If it happens that you are the only member in your 
group you receive 20 tokens in Stage 1 and 20 tokens in Stage 2, i.e. your round payoff 
amounts to 40. You neither have to take any action on Stage 1 nor on Stage 2. 
Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you receive a detailed 
overview of the results obtained in all groups. For every group member you are informed 
about her: Contribution to the project, payoff from the Stage 1, assigned tokens (if possible), 
received tokens (if possible), payoff from Stage 2, round payoff. 
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round you receive an 
overview of the average results (as above) of all previous rounds. 
Total Payoff: The total payoff from the experiment is composed of the starting capital of 
1000 tokens plus the sum of round payoffs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment 
your total payoff will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 € per 100 tokens. 
Please notice: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. no 
other participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The 
payment is anonymous too, i.e. no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
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Appendix 2.2. Corollaries, proofs and calculations 
Corollary 1 (to Proposition 4 (b) in FS) From Proposition 4 (b) of FS (p. 849) we know that 
if the number of free-riders Nk  is sufficiently high, i.e., if 
(A1) 2/)1( ank NN ≥− , 
then there is a unique equilibrium in which no player contributes. In our model, for Na , we 
















≥  then there exists a unique equilibrium in NSC in which all players contribute 
















. Hence, if the number of free-riders exceeds 2/R  we can be sure that no 
equilibrium with strictly positive contributions exists. 
Corollary 2 (to Proposition 4 in FS) If all players in NSC are conditional cooperators then 
there exist equilibria in NSC in which all players contribute }...0{ yg N ∈ to the joint project. 
Proof to Corollary 2 A conditional cooperator is ready to increase his/her own contribution if 
all others contribute more. Suppose all players are conditional cooperators and contribute Ng . 
In this case a conditional cooperator has no incentive to deviate to a lower contribution 
Ni gg <  since for him or her (by assumption) the monetary benefit of withholding a dollar is 
lower than the total loss from deviation βθ +a . 
Proof to Lemma 1 Without any punishment, the players who contribute g  have a lower 
monetary payoff than the deviator who contributes ggi <  and in addition a disutility from 
inequality to their disadvantage. Assume that each of the 'Sn  players punishes with the same 
punishment amount ∗γ . Then, the monetary payoff of a punisher j  who contributes g  and 
punishes with ∗γ  is: ∗−+−+−= γcggnagyx iSSj ])1[(  The payoff of the contribution 
deviator i  who contributes ggi <  is: 
∗−+−+−= γ'])1[( SiSSii nggnagyx . To determine 
the punishment level ∗γ  that equalizes the monetary payoff of the ' 1S Sn n≤ −  punishers and 








γ . Q.E.D. 
Proof to Proposition 1 Suppose that the contribution deviator i  is punished with the 
punishment level ∗γ  by each of the 'Sn  punishers. According to Lemma 1 this leads to equal 
monetary payoffs of the contribution deviator and each of the 'Sn  punishers. However, a 
punisher may increase its monetary payoff by deviating to a lower punishment level ∗< γγ D . 
At the same time, this deviation generates (a) advantageous inequality in comparison to the 
other punishers, (b) disadvantageous inequality to the contribution deviator and (c) it 
decreases the disadvantageous inequality to the contributors who do not punish. To answer 
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the question whether a deviation from the punishment level ∗γ  is profitable, we calculate the 
net utility change through deviation in punishment. The payoff of the punishment deviator 




j cggnagyx γ−+−+−= ])1[(  
The payoff of the contribution deviator i  who contributes ggi <  and does not punish is: 
D
SiSSii nggnagyx γγ −−−+−+−=
∗)1'(])1[(  
Next to this player there are )1'( −− SS nn  non-punishing contributors l  who contribute g  but 
refrain from the punishment. The payoff of each of these players is: 
])1[( iSSl ggnagyx +−+−=  
The payoff of each of the )1'( −Sn  punishers m  who contribute g  and punish with 
∗γ  is: 
∗−+−+−= γcggnagyx iSSm ])1[(  
According to (4) the utility of the punishment deviator is then 
(A2) DiSS
D























































In the first line of (A2) the monetary payoff of the punishment deviator is shown; the first 
term in the second line (in big parentheses) shows the utility loss through disadvantageous 
inequality with respect to the contribution deviator who contributes ggi < . The second term 
in the second line reflects the utility loss due to the payoff inequity between the punishment 
deviator and the contributors who do not punish. Finally, the term in the third line shows the 
utility loss due to the inequality in payoffs between the punishment deviator and players who 
punish with level ∗γ . 
Whether the utility from deviating to a punishment level Dγ  exceeds the utility from sticking 
to ∗γ , depends on the costs of punishment in relation to its “gain”. The utility of the deviator 



























< . Q.E.D. 










































  is independent of Dγ , Dju  is maximized with 
∗= γγ D  if the right-hand side of 
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Proof to Proposition 2 In Corollary 2 we have already shown that even without the threat of 
punishment, no conditional cooperator has an incentive to deviate if all others contribute g, 
because the utility from the material gain from a deviation would be (more than) destroyed by 
the utility loss from advantageous inequality. Here we show that no player (neither a 
conditional cooperator nor a free-rider) has an incentive to deviate if (7) is satisfied. Suppose 
that player i  deviates by contributing ggi < . Then (as shown in Proposition 1) the enforcers 














































 for all 1<c  it follows that ggi =  maximizes the utility. Thus, a 
deviation to ggi <  is not profitable. Q.E.D. 
Proof to Proposition 3 If no player satisfies condition (7) then punishment is not credible and 
absent. We already have shown in Corollary 1 that in a non-sanctioning-community 






1− . Q.E.D. 
Proof to Corollary 3 Assume the existence of 'Sn  enforcers. Each of the 'Sn  enforcers j has 













By contradiction we show that ( ) 1' <− SS nnc  has to be satisfied. Suppose ( ) 1' ≥− SS nnc . 
Then (A5) would imply that 
( 1) ( ' 1)
1 1S j S
j
c n c nβ
α
− + −
− >  which is equivalent to 
( 1) ( ' 1)
0S j S
j
c n c nβ
α
− + −





 is always strictly positive for each of the 'Sn  enforcers. Hence 
( ) 1' <− SS nnc has to be satisfied. Q.E.D. 
Proof to Lemma 2 Assume that each of the 'Sn  players rewards every other contributor with 
the same reward amount Sρ . The costs of rewarding are assumed to be strictly lower than 1, 
i.e., 1<c . Then, the payoff of a reward provider j  who contributes g  and rewards with Sρ  
is: SS
S
SSSj ncngnagyx ρρ )1'()1'(' −+−−+−= . The payoff of a free-rider i  who refrains 
from contributing and rewarding is: gnayx SSi '+= . To determine the reward level 
Sρ  that 
equalizes the monetary payoff of a reward provider and a free-rider, we set ji xx =  and solve 






gρ . Rewarding with Sρρ < does clearly not pay since in 
this case contributors suffer from disadvantageous inequality with respect to the free-riders. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof to Proposition 4 We have to check whether one of the 'SS nn −  free-riders has an 
incentive to deviate and contribute also 0>g  in order to be rewarded by the conditional 
cooperators. If deviation is profitable then there exists no separating equilibrium with the 
properties described in Proposition 4. The payoff of the deviating free-rider who contributes 




i ngnagyx ρ')1'( +++−=  
The payoff of each of the )1'( −− SS nn  free-riders who contribute zero is: 
gnayx SSi )1'( ++=  
The payoff of each of the 'Sn  reward providers who contribute 0>g  and reward with 
Sρ  is: 
cnngnagyx SS
S
SSSj ρρ ')1'()1'( −−+++−=  
The utility of the deviating free-rider then is: 
(A6) SSSS
D





































In the first line of (A6) the monetary payoff of the deviating free-rider is shown; the term in 
the second line (in big parentheses) shows the utility loss through advantageous inequality 
with respect to the )1'( −− SS nn  free-riders who do not contribute. The term in the third line 
reflects the utility loss due to the advantageous inequality with respect to the 'Sn  reward 
providers who reward with level Sρ . 
To check whether a free-rider has an incentive to deviate, we have to compare the player’s 
utility from deviation (A6) with the utility the player would obtain from the equilibrium 
strategy. Since in equilibrium all players would obtain the same monetary payoff the utility of 
a free-rider is (who contributes zero in equilibrium) is: 
gnayu SSi '+=  
Hence, if 0>− i
D


























then the player deviates. We insert the payoff equalizing reward level in the inequality (with 

















If a free-rider has a sufficiently low iβ  then this player deviates from contributing zero to 
contributing g in order to be rewarded on the second stage. However, according to the 
assumption of the FS model a free-rider satisfies the condition Si a−< 1β . It can be easily 
shown that if the productivity of the joint project is strictly higher than 1 then the right side of 












S . This means, a free-rider satisfies always the condition (A7) 
thus having always an incentive to deviate. Hence, a separating equilibrium as described in 
Proposition 4 cannot exist. 
Proof to Proposition 5 Suppose that each player who contributes 0>g  in Stage 1 (i.e., all 
players) is rewarded with ∗ρ  by each of the 'Sn  reward providers. However, a reward 
provider may increase monetary payoff by deviating from the reward level ∗ρ  to a lower 
reward level Dρ . By deviating to ∗< ρρ D , the reward deviator increases own payoff and 
creates a payoff inequality to the own advantage with respect to other reward providers who 
stick to ∗ρ . On the other hand, the reward deviator suffers from inequality to the own 
disadvantage with respect to the reward free-riders. To answer the question whether a 
deviation from the reward level ∗ρ  is profitable, we calculate the net utility change through 
 91
the deviation in rewarding. The payoff of the reward deviator who contributes 0>g  but 
rewards just Dρ  is: 




j ncngnagyx  
The payoff of each of the )'( SS nn −  reward free-riders who contribute 0>g  but do not 
reward is: 
D
SSSi ngnagyx ρρ +−++−=
∗)1'(  
If one of the reward providers deviates then there are )1'( −Sn  reward providers who 
contribute 0>g  and reward with ∗ρ . The payoff of each of these players is: 
D
SSSSj ncngnagyx ρρρ +−+−−+−=
∗∗ )2'()1(  
According to (4), the utility of the reward deviator is then: 








































In the first line of (A8) the monetary payoff of the reward deviator is shown; the term in the 
second line (in big parentheses) shows the utility loss through disadvantageous inequality 
with respect to the )'( SS nn −  free-riders. The term in the third line reflects the utility loss due 
to advantageous inequality with respect to the other )1'( −Sn  reward providers who reward 
with level ∗ρ . Whether the utility from deviating to a reward level Dρ  exceeds the utility 
from sticking to reward level ∗ρ  depends on the costs of rewarding in relation to its “gain”. 






























































 is independent of Dρ , Dju  is maximized with 
∗= ρρ D  if the right-hand side of 
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Appendix 3.1. Instructions to the experiment 
 
General Information: At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to 
one of 2 subpopulations each consisting of 12 participants. During the whole experiment 
you will interact only with the members of your subpopulation. At the beginning of the 
experiment, 1000 experimental tokens will be assigned to the experimental account of each 
participant. 
Course of Action: The experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages. In 
Stage 1, the group choice and the decision regarding the contribution to the project take place. 
In Stage 2, participants may influence the earnings of the other group members. 
Stage 1 
(i) The Group Choice: In Stage 1, each participant decides which group she wants to join. 
There are two different groups that can be joined: 
 Influence on the earnings of other group members
A: No 
Group 
B: Yes, by assigning negative points 
(ii) Contributing to the Project: In stage 1 of each round, each group member is endowed 
with 20 tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute to 
the project. The remaining tokens will be kept by yourself. 
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1: Your payoff in stage 1 consists of two components: 
• tokens you have kept = endowment – your contribution to the project 
• earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 1 amounts to: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.6x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of group members 
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group 
member. Please note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e. 
each group member benefits from all contributions to the project. 
Stage 2: Assignment of Tokens: In stage 2 it will be displayed how much each group 
member contributed to the project. (Please note: Before each round a display order will 
randomly be determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify any group member by her 
position on the displayed list throughout different rounds.) By the assignment of tokens you 
can reduce the payoff of a group member or keep it unchanged. 
In each round each participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2. You have to decide 
how many from the 20 tokens you are going to assign to other group members. The remaining 
tokens are kept by yourself. You can check the costs of your token assignment by pressing the 
button Calculation of Tokens. 
• Each negative token that you assign to a group member reduces her payoff by 3 
tokens. 
• If you assign 0 tokens to a group member her payoff won’t change.  
Calculation of your payoff in stage 2: Your payoff in stage 2 consists of two components: 
• tokens you kept = 20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to the other group 
members 
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• less the threefold number of negative tokens you have received from other group 
members 
Thus, your payoff in Stage 2 amounts to:  
20 – sum of the tokens that you assigned to other group members 
     – 3x (the number of tokens you received from other group members) 
Calculation of your round payoff: Your round payoff is composed of 
 Your payoff 
from Stage 1 
20 – your contribution to the project + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of 
all group members / number of group members 
+ Your payoff 
from Stage 2 
20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to other group members 
     – 3 x (the number of tokens you have received from other group 
members 
= Your round payoff 
Special case: a single group member: If it happens that you are the only member in your 
group you receive 20 tokens in Stage 1 and 20 tokens in Stage 2, i.e., your round payoff 
amounts to 40. You neither have to take any action on Stage 1 nor on Stage 2. 
Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you receive a detailed 
overview of the results obtained in all groups. For every group member you are informed 
about her: Contribution to the project, payoff from the Stage 1, assigned tokens (if possible), 
received tokens (if possible), payoff from Stage 2, round payoff. 
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round you receive an 
overview of the average results (as above) of all previous rounds. 
Report sheet about the decisions of participants of a previously conducted experiment 
Each participant receives a report sheet about the decisions of participants of a previous 
experiment which was conducted in the eLab at the University Erfurt in January 2004. In this 
report you will find average numbers of the decisions of the participants. Please read this 
report before you decide. 
Total Payoff: The total payoff from the experiment is composed of the starting capital of 
1000 tokens plus the sum of round payoffs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment 
your total payoff will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 € per 100 tokens. 
Please notice: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a 
question please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. no 
other participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The 
payment is anonymous too, i.e. no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
We wish you success! 
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Appendix 4.1. Instructions to the experiment 
 
General Information: At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned to 
groups each consisting of 6 participants. One of the members in your group is randomly 
chosen as Type A participant. All other members in your group become Type B participants. 
During the whole experiment your type does not change and you only interact with the 
members of your own group. At the beginning of the experiment, 500 experimental tokens 
are assigned to the experimental account of each participant. 
Course of Action: The experiment consists of 30 rounds containing three blocks of periods 
of 10 rounds each. Before each block starts (i.e., before Round 1, 11, and 21) the Type A 
player chooses between two modes of token allocation: “allocation of positive tokens” or 
“allocation of negative tokens”. 
Each round consists of 2 stages. In stage 1, each group member (Type A as well as Type B 
participant) decides on the individual contribution to the project. In stage 2 Type A participant 
may influence the earnings of the other group members by allocating tokens. 
Stage 1: Contributing to the Project: In stage 1 of each round, each group member is 
endowed with 20 tokens. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you are going to 
contribute to the project. The remaining tokens are kept in your account. 
Calculation of your payoff in stage 1: Your payoff in stage 1 consists of two components: 
• tokens you keep = endowment – your contribution to the project 
• earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members 
Thus, your payoff in stage 1 amounts to: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / number of group members 
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group 
member. Please note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e. 
each group member benefits from all contributions to the project. 
Stage 2: Assignment of Tokens by the Type A participant: In stage 2 the Type A 
participant gets informed about how many tokens each group member contributed to the 
project. (Please note: Before each round the display order of the Type B participants is 
randomly determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify a Type B participant by his or her 
position on the displayed list throughout different rounds.) 
By the assignment of tokens the Type A participant can increase or reduce the payoff 
(according to the chosen mode for the allocation of tokens) of a group member or keep it 
unchanged. 
In each round the type A participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2. The type A 
participant has to decide how many of the 20 tokens he or she is going to assign to each of the 
other group members. The remaining tokens are kept by the Type A participant. The Type A 
participant can check the costs of the token assignment by pressing the button Calculation of 
Tokens. 
• The assignment of 0 tokens to a Type B participant does not change his or her payoff.  
• If the mode “allocation of positive tokens” is chosen for the current 10 block period, 
each positive token that is assigned to a Type B participant increases his or her 
payoff by 3 tokens. 
• If the mode “allocation of negative tokens” is chosen for the 10 block period, each 
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negative token that is assigned to a Type B participant reduces his or her payoff by 
3 tokens. 
Calculation of payoffs in stage 2: 
Type A participant: Your payoff in stage 2 consists of tokens you keep 
= 20 – sum of the tokens that you have assigned to the other group members 
Type B participant: If the mode “allocation of negative tokens” is chosen 
Your (negative) payoff from stage 2 is given by 3 x the number of tokens that you have 
received from the Type A participant. 
Calculation of your round payoff: 
Your round payoff = Your payoff from stage 1 + your payoff from stage 2 
Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you receive a detailed 
overview of the results obtained in all groups. For every group member you are informed 
about his or her contribution to the project, payoff from stage 1, assigned tokens (Type A 
participant), received tokens (Type B participants), payoff from stage 2, round payoff. (Please 
note: Before each round the display order of the Type B participants is randomly be 
determined. Thus, it is not possible to identify a Type B participant by his or her position on 
the displayed list throughout different rounds.) 
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round you receive an 
overview of the average results (as above) of all previous rounds. Additionally, the Type A 
participant receives this overview each time before each block starts i.e., when he or she 
decides on the mode of token allocation. 
Total Payoff: The total payoff from the experiment is composed of the starting capital of 500 
tokens plus the sum of round payoffs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment your 
total payoff will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 € per 100 tokens. 
Please notice: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have any 
questions please raise your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e. no other 
participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The 
payment is anonymous too, i.e. no participant gets to know the payoff of another participant. 
 
We wish you success! 
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Appendix 4.2. Supporting Figures 
 
Figure A4.1 Average contributions over periods in all teams 
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Figure A4.3: Path-dependent contributions in different phases 
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